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Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement 
Cristie L. Ford1 
“[A] SINGLE ENFORCEMENT ACTION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO EFFECT 
CHANGE ON AN ENORMOUS SCALE, CAUSING THE DEVELOPMENT OR 
ENHANCEMENT OF INTERNAL CONTROLS, SUPERVISORY PROCEDURES, AND 
COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS AT HUNDREDS OF OTHER COMPANIES.”2 
“THE SPECTER OF PROSECUTION CAN MOTIVATE CORPORATIONS TO CHANGE 
THEIR LONG-TERM BEHAVIOR . . . .”3 
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REMEDIAL AGNOSTICISM ......................................................................................67 
POSTSCRIPT: A DIFFERENT KIND OF GOVERNANCE....................................................................71 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
the Commission) expanded its mandate in recent years, in the wake of 
multiple scandals: its Enforcement Division (Enforcement) was no longer 
satisfied with punishing wrongdoing, but through the specter of prosecution 
intended to effect compliance change to internal controls, supervisory 
procedures, and compliance functions on an “enormous scale,” and to 
motivate “long-term” change in corporate behavior.  In effect, the quotes 
from senior SEC officers with which this paper opens suggest that 
Enforcement has been aspiring to changing corporate culture.4  The SEC has 
not only emphasized the necessity of having a “culture of compliance,” but 
expressed awareness of and concern for companies’ “moral DNA.”5  
Enforcement’s approach to this goal has been characterized, above 
all, by increasingly massive monetary penalties levied against firms—that is, 
against public companies and regulated entities.6  Under Chairman William 
H. Donaldson, who resigned in June of this year, the SEC initiated 
enforcement actions against more organizations and imposed more and 
larger civil penalties than at any time in its seven-decade history.7  These 
extraordinary fines were combined with a published SEC protocol that 
allowed firms to bid for leniency in settlements, in exchange for cooperating 
with Enforcement after apparent wrongdoing has been uncovered, and/or for 
having in place an internal compliance program.   
Yet each of the SEC’s recent strategies—massive monetary 
sanctions and a settlement protocol that permits bargaining for leniency on 
the terms above—was inadequate if the goal was sincerely to motivate long-
term change in firm behavior.  First, monetary penalties do not address the 
thornier problems of institutional culture except in the most accidental way.  
While optimal penalties (to the extent that optimality can be identified) may 
deter companies from engaging in open and clearly law-violating conduct, 
                                                 
4A similar observation could be made about criminal securities law enforcement, but that 
must be the subject of another paper.  Michael Chertoff, Former Assistant Attorney General, 
Criminal Division, Department of Justice, has reportedly expressed the view that criminal 
prosecution, also, can be “a spur for institutional reform.”  Michael Chertoff, Speech at the 
ABA Criminal Justice Section’s 17th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime, (Mar. 
2003), as recorded by John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry That They’re 
Doing the Government’s Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89-JUN A.B.A. J. 46 
(June 2003).  See also infra note 11.   
5See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
6I use the terms “organizations” and “firms” to refer collectively to public companies and 
other regulated entities subject to the SEC’s enforcement jurisdiction.  For clarity’s sake, I 
periodically employ terms such as “corporate governance” or “corporate citizen,” but I mean 
those terms to apply to regulated entities as well.  
7See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. 
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they are unpredictable as a tool for effecting ambitious cultural change.  
Because deterrence effects are inscrutable, massive deterrence looks like the 
last resort of the regulator who has given up trying to identify, or address, 
root causes of social and economic problems in any more systematic way.  
This is not to say that deterrence-based mechanisms may not be useful in 
effecting widespread reforms; only that they are insufficient on their own, 
and potentially unwieldy.   
Second, the SEC’s settlement protocol, called the “Framework for 
Cooperation,”8 does not advance and may even undermine the stated goal of 
promoting good corporate governance.  Specifically, it is not the case that 
either of the Framework’s criteria—having in place a compliance program, 
and/or cooperating with Enforcement ex post—is a reliable indicator of 
good corporate citizenship.  In fact, for the worst offenders, cooperating 
with authorities can be a mechanism for scapegoating individuals and 
avoiding organizational responsibility.  Extending leniency to firms that 
have a compliance program in place can mean in practice that formulaic and 
facial compliance indicia substitute for evidence that a real “culture of 
compliance” exists. 
If the SEC is serious about spurring institutional reform, it will need 
enforcement tools that are better suited to its purpose.  Interestingly, during 
Chairman Donaldson’s era, Enforcement also roughed out the promising 
beginnings of a new, or resurgent, model in what I call the “Reform 
Undertaking.”  Under a Reform Undertaking arrangement, SEC 
Enforcement and the firm enter into a settlement agreement relating to an 
action that Enforcement has initiated for violation of the securities laws.  
One term of the settlement agreement is that the firm shall retain, at its own 
expense, an independent third party monitor (the “Third Party”) to oversee 
its compliance processes and procedures for a period of time after the 
settlement has been concluded.9  The Reform Undertaking model has 
                                                 
8See infra Part 2. 
9The Reform Undertaking shares key features with another innovation in federal criminal 
prosecution: the organizational Deferred Prosecution Agreement.  Like the Reform 
Undertaking, the typical Deferred Prosecution Agreement requires firms to adopt internal 
controls designed to deter potential violations of firm policies and procedures, and to 
cooperate with an independent third party monitor who will report at intervals to the 
Department of Justice.  Failure to abide by the terms satisfactorily over the span of the 
deferral results in prosecution.  See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, America 
Online Charged with Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud; Prosecution Deferred for Two 
Years (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel04/aolrelease121504.htm; 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc., Cr. No. 
04-837 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.ca.com/about/dpa/def_pros_agreement.pdf; 
Press Release, Department of Justice, PNC ICLC Corp. Enters Into Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement with the United States (June 2, 2003), 
.  The Department of Justice also 
incorporated auditing mechanisms and structural changes to its Enron-related settlements 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03_crm_329.htm
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important advantages over more traditional settlement approaches in that it 
uncouples the acute enforcement action from the specifics of reform 
measures, thereby reducing some of the pressure toward strategic action.  It 
goes beyond a pure deterrence model and tries to investigate “corporate 
culture,” by making firm actors agents of their own change, in a way that it 
is more transparent and accountable than the existing Framework for 
Cooperation approach.   
Some things are likely to change under new SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox.  For example, he is likely to discontinue the substantial 
monetary penalties levied against organizations that became controversial in 
the last months of Chairman Donaldson’s tenure.10  On the other hand, the 
published SEC protocol mentioned above, which allows firms to bid for 
leniency, is likely to persist since the philosophy underlying it—that firms 
should be rewarded for cooperating with Enforcement and for having 
internal compliance programs in place—has not been seriously questioned.  
We should also expect the Reform Undertaking model, as an alternative to 
heavy monetary fines, to increase in currency under Chairman Cox.  
Chairman Cox is generally understood to be a strong ally of business 
community interests, which have opposed what they perceive as overzealous 
regulation under Chairman Donaldson.11  The Reform Undertaking model is 
theoretically consistent with a more decentralized, industry-driven 
regulatory agenda.   
Less obvious but just as important is that, when properly 
implemented, the Reform Undertaking model may contain the power, 
unanticipated by advocates of industry-driven regulation, to effect verifiable 
positive change to a firm’s culture, institutions, and long-term behavior.  
This paper explores and then extrapolates from the Reform Undertaking, 
informed in part by “new governance” or “experimentalist” theory,12 to 
sketch the directions in which the Reform Undertaking must go if it is to 
have a real chance of effecting such change.  By relating SEC Enforcement 
                                                                                                                  
with CIBC and Merrill Lynch.  Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Director, Enron Task Force, 
Department of Justice, to Gary Naftalis, Esq. (Dec. 22, 2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/cibcagreement.pdf; Letter from Leslie R. 
Caldwell, Director, Enron Task Force, Department of Justice, to Robert S. Morvillo, Esq. and 
Charles Stillman, Esq. (Sept. 17, 2003), 
.  See also Off the 
Hook: Deferred Prosecution Agreements on the Rise, 48 CORP. CRIME REP. 1, (Dec. 10, 
2004).  While Deferred Prosecution Agreements work on a similar model and deserve their 
own analysis, they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/merrill_lynchagreement.pdf
10See Deborah Solomon & John D. McKinnon, Off the Beat: Donaldson Ends an SEC Tenure 
Marked by Active Regulation, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at A1. See also infra note 27 (for 
criticism that the SEC’s implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 imposed extraordinary 
costs on business without corresponding benefit). 
11Id.  
12See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text. 
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practices to New Governance, I am connecting promising on-the-ground 
developments that may be proceeding ad hoc, without guiding principle, to a 
relevant theoretical conversation.  I argue for four things above all: the need 
for the Reform Undertaking to be built around a participatory firm process; 
the need for Third Parties to be accountable for their methodology and 
results within firms’ Reform Undertakings; the need for the SEC to develop 
the information-gathering capacity to credibly evaluate Reform 
Undertakings’ success; and the need to provide consistent incentives to 
Enforcement personnel.   
Along the way, this paper identifies the potential for a securities law 
enforcement function that leverages enforcers’ one-case-at-a-time approach, 
as well as their coercive powers, in the service of a more effective and more 
rational regulatory project.  As a mechanism for affecting corporate culture 
on a broad scale, the re-imagined Enforcement compares favorably not only 
with existing enforcement structures, but also with regulatory rule-making.  
In this way, this paper seeks to somewhat rehabilitate the enforcement idea 
among New Governance theorists.  The coercive enforcement function (as 
distinct from arm’s length judicial action) has been understudied and at 
times undervalued by New Governance theorists.  Yet frontline SEC 
Enforcement staff is developing a unique experimentalist structure in the 
interstices of its practice, characterized by endogenous problem solving 
embedded within and buttressed by an exogenous punitive, adversarial, 
compliance-oriented system.  The result is more than just a variant on the 
existing theoretical approach: it represents a fresh interface between a state-
sanctioned administrative enforcement pyramid and systemic, complex 
problems like corporate cultural dysfunction.  This project explores that 
interface and finds reason to be optimistic, even in the context of regulatory 
settlements, reached with enforcement staff, with all the real-life constraints 
of capacity and method that entails. 
This paper proceeds in five parts.  Part One describes the limitations 
of the SEC’s deterrence-based strategy in meeting the agency’s stated 
intention of spurring institutional reform, and suggests that a New 
Governance-style approach may be better suited to the task.  It also 
identifies challenges, relative to other New Governance initiatives, arising 
from the securities laws’ enforcement-driven and settlement-oriented 
environment.  Part Two describes problems with the second component part 
of the SEC’s strategy, the Framework for Cooperation, which permits firms 
to bid for leniency in exchange for having in place facial indicia of 
compliance, and/or for cooperating with Enforcement ex post.  Part Three 
describes and provides examples of the new settlement approach that I call 
the Reform Undertaking.  This Part sets out the Reform Undertaking’s 
advantages over either pure deterrence-based mechanisms or Framework for 
Cooperation-based settlements.  Part Four identifies the shortcomings of the 
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Reform Undertaking in its current iteration, and points to the four additional 
elements it needs to be a more thoroughgoing and theoretically coherent 
approach.  The final Part imagines a New Governance-inflected approach to 
enforcement conduct, which leverages its strengths as a hybrid enforcement-
oriented experimentalist form. 
1.  Corporate Governance and Deterrence-Based Response 
Scope Concerns 
This paper starts from a position that should be uncontroversial by 
now: that industries, companies, and organizations have cultures of their 
own; that culture affects how those organizations behave; and that certain 
kinds of cultural attributes can cause organizations to behave in law-
violating ways.13  I do not attempt, nor is it necessary to completely define 
“firm culture,” except to note that some organizations can be characterized 
by an “insiders’ culture,” which rewards in-group loyalty at the expense of 
the best interests of “outsiders,” such as general shareholders or the public.  
Loyalty may take the form of keeping confidences, or making contributions 
to in-group members’ income or market share by means that would be 
criticized were they widely known.  For example, in the securities industry, 
investment advisors may fail to tell mutual fund shareholders about 
excessive fees or “shelf space” commissions;14 audit firms may fail to tell an 
audit client’s shareholders about conflicts of interest that could compromise 
the independence of an audit;15 or investment banks may fail to tell the 
public that the research analysis they produce has a remuneratory 
relationship to banking business, before and after initial public offerings.16 
                                                 
13See, e.g., JAMES W. COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE (1989); KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS 
FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1990); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the 
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The 
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 10-45 (2003) (canvassing sociolegal 
literature on the relationship between social environment and individual ethical conduct).  
Firms, especially the worst actors, may also be very dysfunctional in the manner described in 
MAX H. BAZERMAN & MICHAEL D. WATKINS, PREDICTABLE SURPRISES: THE DISASTERS YOU 
SHOULD HAVE SEEN COMING AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM 95-119 (2004).  The 
recommendations that follow apply equally there. 
14Richard C. Schoenstein et al., Investigations of Mutual Fund Industry Still Gathering 
Steam, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 2004, at 9. 
15See, e.g., In re Ernst & Young LLP, Initial Decision Release No. 249 (Apr. 16, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id249bpm.htm; Final Order, Securities Act Release No. 
8413 (April 26, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/33-8413.htm [hereinafter Ernst & 
Young]; Cassell Bryan-Low, Did Ties That Bind Also Blind KPMG?, WALL ST. J., June 18, 
2003, at C1; Floyd Norris, Andersen Told To Split Audits and Consulting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 2002, at C1. 
16Documents relating to the Global Research Analyst Settlement are collected at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement.htm. 
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Cultures are not monolithic, and they have as much to do with 
situation and human psychology as with some notion of firm “character.”  
But regardless of their provenance, the norms, customs, and rituals that arise 
in tight-knit communities may create a compelling moral world for those in 
it.17  Insiders’ ethical perceptions of conduct are shaped by the actions of 
those around them, normalizing and even ratcheting up law-violating 
conduct and marginalizing dissenters.18  In an extreme form, an “insiders’ 
culture” may disdain and try to circumvent inconvenient, externally imposed 
regulations on issues ranging from employment discrimination, to revenue 
recognition, to toxic waste disposal.  Insiders’ cultures put in place, 
intentionally or accretively (through situational pressures or escalation of 
commitment), structures and relationships that maintain the culture’s 
opacity.  Such public-harming cultures can exist notwithstanding 
governance processes and compliance mechanisms that look exemplary on 
paper.  A classic example of this phenomenon is Enron, whose Board of 
Directors voted to waive that company’s state-of-the-art conflict of interest 
rules to allow CFO Andrew Fastow to make self-dealing transactions.19  
WorldCom also adhered to “‘checklists’ of recommended ‘best practices.’”20 
Although all organizations have cultures, and even some degree of 
“insider culture,” let me be clear about the firms that are of primary concern.  
They are those firms that Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, in their seminal 
work Responsive Regulation, would put at or near the top of the 
“enforcement pyramid”—those firms that attract the greatest enforcement 
resources because other, lesser attempts at regulation have failed.21  These 
                                                 
17See Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 103-113, 138-144 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992). 
18See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 240 (1983) 
(discussing how criminal behavior is learned in association with those who define such 
criminal behavior favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably); Kenneth 
D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences of Issue-Related 
and Social Context Factors, 53 HUM. REL. 981, 999-1001 (2000) (empirical study of impact 
of perceived social consensus on ethical decisionmaking).  This provides a strong theoretical 
justification for conspiracy laws: even where a conspiracy did not successfully complete a 
criminal act, conspiracy itself is a crime because collective action emboldens individual 
wrongdoers.  Neal Kumar Katyar, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1307 (2003).   
19See William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 9, 22-23, (2002), 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf; see also Dallas, 
supra note 13, at 45-54 (examining Enron’s ethical climate); Ernst & Young, supra note 15 
(describing “sham” compliance procedures). 
20Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust:  Report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, On Corporate Governance for the 
Future of MCI 20, 25 (Aug. 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/wcomreport0803.pdf. 
21Ayres and Braithwaite describe a regulatory structure in which enforcers have an escalating 
scale of enforcement options at their disposal.  The majority of firms, at the broad base of the 
pyramid, stay in compliance with little resource expenditure by enforcers.  As firm 
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are the same firms whose conduct attracts (or should attract) the largest 
monetary sanctions, in settlements based on serious allegations of fraud or 
something close to it,22 where the degree of harm resulting from the alleged 
violations is significant.  Often, they are recidivists, even if past violations 
are not identical to the current one.  There is reason to believe (regardless of 
what the firm claims) that the firm suffers from pervasive cultural or ethical 
problems that are likely to persist beyond the immediate enforcement action, 
but these are not utterly criminal enterprises.  My preoccupation, then, is 
what Christopher Stone once described as “that group of firms, impossible 
to identify in advance, whose behavior in the face of realistically achievable 
penalty levels will remain inadequately modified.”23    These are the “worst 
actors.”   
I argue below for a remedy that is more interventionist than existing 
remedies, and that will impose additional costs on worst actor firms.  The 
firms are required to engage in a protracted remedial exercise in which they 
define and apply standards-based (as opposed to narrower rule-based) 
notions of good governance to their own operations.  Readers may 
reasonably counter that additional regulatory costs should not be imposed on 
firms without some indication that the project’s benefits would outweigh its 
costs.  A complete response to this challenge is beyond this paper’s scope, 
but three points are relevant.  First, interventionist remedies would not be 
appropriate all the way down the enforcement pyramid.24  I am talking about 
a relatively small subset of firms.  Second, and just as crucially, this paper 
argues for a standards-based approach in the remedial enforcement context.  
The cost of post-enforcement standards-based remedies should compare 
favorably to the cost of prophylactic standards-based requirements, such as 
the controversial provisions in section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that 
require public companies to report on the adequacy of their internal financial 
controls.25  Third, any cost/benefit analysis should factor in not only the 
                                                                                                                  
noncompliance escalates, enforcers can escalate deterrence, reserving the most severe 
sanctions for the small number of very serious cases.  See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 35-41 (1992).  The enforcement pyramid’s effectiveness depends 
very much on Enforcement’s ability to collect and interpret valid data on firm cooperation. 
22E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (2004). 
23Christopher Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 
90 YALE L. J. 1, 28 (1980). 
24The whole purpose of the regulatory pyramid is to allocate scarce enforcement resources 
toward the worst offenders, and to avoid the chilling effect of over-regulating law-abiding 
firms.  See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-41; see also EUGENE BARDACH & 
ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 
(1982) (arguing that regulatory strategy based mostly on punishment fosters resistance within 
regulated firms). 
25See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262.  Whether or not such 
certification requirements are a necessary part of the regulatory scheme, their costs can be 
significant.  See, e.g., John Thain, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too High?  WALL. ST. J., 
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immediate cost outlay the Reform Undertaking represents, but also the 
substantial long-term costs the status quo imposes on consumer confidence 
and firm viability. 
Responding to the opposite challenge, this is not a marginal project 
even if only a few firms are involved.  Worst-acting firms should attract 
scrutiny because they are responsible for disproportionate social costs.  
Understanding the full range of reasons why certain firm cultures bring forth 
repeated law-violating conduct also sheds light on firm culture generally.  
Moreover, the problem of the worst actor sheds light on the effectiveness of 
the securities law regime as a whole.  In evaluating outcomes, regulatory 
policymakers may be tempted to focus on “gold star” companies whose 
success proves the wisdom of the regulators’ approach.  A focus on 
enforcement blunts that tendency.  It keeps us realistic—not only with 
respect to proposals that may be credulous about firms’ bona fides 
generally, but also with respect to proposals that underscrutinize firm 
functionality in the name of an ostensibly tough (but actually limited) 
deterrence approach.  Limitations of method in spurring reform among 
worst actors can be a telltale for a more general limitation of method. 
Relying on Massive Deterrence 
One strategy that SEC Enforcement is not likely to pursue under 
Chairman Cox is the imposition of massive deterrent monetary fines on 
organizations, as well as individuals.  Some advocates of strong corporate 
accountability mechanisms may see this as a negative development.  It is not 
necessarily so, for the reasons below. 
Under Chairman Donaldson, the SEC’s approach to the recent crisis 
was to step up prosecutions, including prosecutions against organizations, 
and to impose massive monetary fines on individuals, regulated entities, and 
public companies.26  The presumption was that “any serious violation of the 
                                                                                                                  
May 27, 2004, at A20; Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of 
Corporate Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002);  Stone, supra note 
23, at 36-45 (distinguishing between the substantial cost of standard-based directives when 
applied broadly, as opposed to their most circumscribed cost in the retrospective remedial 
situation).  On the distinction between rules and standards, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
26In 2003, the Division of Enforcement filed 679 enforcement actions, more than in any 
previous year.  See William H. Donaldson, Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute (Mar. 5, 
2004), http://www.sec.gov/speech/spch030504whd.htm.  According to Commissioner Harvey 
Goldschmid, statistics show an approximate 40 percent increase in enforcement cases brought 
by the Commission between fiscal years 2001 and 2004.  See Richard Hill, Goldschmid: 
Companies Should Not Let SEC Enforcement Hinder Their Creativity, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 2203 (Dec. 13, 2004).  Stephen Cutler has observed that his Enforcement 
Division imposed 15 penalties over $50 million between early 2003 and fall 2004, including 
many of the highest penalties ever obtained in SEC enforcement actions.  Stephen M. Cutler, 
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federal securities laws should be penalized with a monetary sanction.”27  
The Enforcement Division has filed an unprecedented number of actions, 
especially against organizations, in the last two years.28  The quantum of the 
penalties is also unprecedented: consider the WorldCom settlement,29 the 
global research analyst settlement,30 the Enron-related financial services 
firm settlements,31 the market timing and late trading mutual fund company 
settlements,32 or those with public companies such as Quest 
                                                                                                                  
Speech: The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the Commission’s Enforcement 
Program (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm. 
27Cutler, supra note 2. 
28Cutler, supra note 26.  Taking a different tack, the New York Stock Exchange, under new 
Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement Susan L. Merrill, is engaged in a 
comprehensive penalty review “designed to change the behavior of firms that run afoul of 
exchange rules on a recurring basis.”  Kip Betz, Comprehensive Penalty Review Underway at 
NYSE Regulation, Official Says, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2116 (Dec. 6, 2004).  Among 
other options, it is considering replacing monetary fines with alternative deterrence strategies 
including suspending certain business lines for a period of time; suspending a firm's ability to 
underwrite an initial public offering of stock or sign new investment banking clients; or 
restricting the opening of new branch office or brokerage accounts.  Id.  Like this paper, the 
NYSE is examining what structural mechanisms, going beyond monetary penalties but 
falling short of the “penalty default” of firm shutdown, might be available to spur 
institutional change among worst actors.  See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.  In a 
similar move, the Federal Reserve recently barred Citigroup from engaging in any major 
acquisitions until the company had “fixe[d its] regulatory problems.”  Mitchell Pacelle et al., 
Fed Ties the Hands of Citigroup, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 18, 2005, at C1. 
29SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (imposing a $2.25 billion 
penalty, satisfied post-bankruptcy at $750 million). 
30Not including disgorgement, civil penalties against the ten firms in their settlements with 
the SEC, NASD, NYSE and states amounted to $487.5 million, with the lead taken by 
Citigroup at $150 million.  Press Release, SEC et al., Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms 
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment 
Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), http://sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
31The SEC levied a total of $197.5 million in civil penalties, alongside substantial 
disgorgement orders, against Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and CIBC.  See In 
re Merrill Lynch & Co., Litigation Release No. 18038 (Mar. 17, 2003), 
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18038.htm; In re Citigroup, Inc., Exchange Act Release 
No. 48230 (July 28, 2003), http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.htm; SEC Charges J.P. 
Morgan Chase In Connection With Enron's Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18252 
(July 28, 2003), http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm; SEC Charges Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce and Three Executives With Aiding and Abetting Enron's 
Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18517 (Dec. 25, 2003), 
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18517.htm. 
32See e.g., In re Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 26629 
(Oct. 8, 2004) ($110 million penalty), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50506.htm; In 
re Alliance Capital Management, L.P., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2205A (Jan. 15, 
2004) ($100 million penalty), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2205a.htm; In re 
Massachusetts Financial Services Co., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2213 (Feb. 5, 
2004) ($50 million), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm; In re Pilgrim Baxter 
& Associates, Ltd., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2251 (June 21, 2004) ($50 million), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2251.htm; In re Putnam Investment Management, 
LLC, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2226 (Apr. 8, 2004) ($50 million), 
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Communications,33 Royal Dutch Shell,34 and Bristol-Myers.35  The SEC also 
supported a still-pending congressional initiative to increase the penalties it 
may levy, which the SEC has described as “an important step in achieving 
the desired deterrent effect under the securities laws.”36 
Former SEC Director of Enforcement Stephen Cutler described the 
era’s approach as “an evolution, if not a revolution, in thinking.”37  The 
nature of the (r)evolution requires some elaboration.  In the speech quoted at 
the beginning of this paper, he explained the shift toward levying massive 
civil fines against organizations, as well as individuals, in terms that suggest 
the view that general deterrence can lead to profound, industry-wide change: 
[P]enalties against entities should be used for the same 
reason they are used in part against individuals—to deter 
misconduct.   
. . . . 
. . . When the Commission obtains a penalty against an 
entity, it provides a powerful incentive for companies in the 
same or similar industries to take steps to prevent and 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2226.htm; In re Janus Capital Management LLC, 
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2277 (Aug. 18, 2004) ($50 million), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2277.htm.  These numbers do not include restitution 
damages.  Some of these firms were also made subject to Reform Undertakings; see infra 
note 142. 
33Qwest Communications consented to disgorge $1 and pay a civil penalty of $250 million, 
the entire amount of which is to be disbursed to investors pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair 
Fund provisions.  See SEC v. Qwest Communications Int’l Inc., Litigation Release No. 
18936 (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18936.htm; see also 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246.   
34The company consented to the entry of a federal court judgment, pursuant to section 21(d) 
of the Exchange Act, to disgorge $1 and pay a $120 million civil penalty. In a related 
administrative proceeding, Royal Dutch Shell undertook to “to spend $5 million in the 
development and implementation of a comprehensive internal compliance program under the 
direction and oversight of [its] Legal Director.”  In re Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 
Exchange Act Release No. 50233 (Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-
50233.pdf.  See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u.   
35Bristol-Myers consented to pay a $100 million fine and to disgorge $50 million.  SEC v. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Litigation Release No. 18820 (Aug. 4, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18820.htm.   
36Stephen M. Cutler, Testimony Concerning The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor 
Restitution Act before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services (June 5, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/060503tssmc.htm.  Commissioner Glassman is one of 
the SEC Commissioners to have expressed reservations about the SEC’s trend toward large 
civil penalties levied against organizations, rather than individuals.  See, e.g., Cynthia A. 
Glassman, Remarks at the 13th Annual Public Fund Boards Forum: The Challenges of 
Striking a Regulatory Balance (Dec. 6, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604cag.htm. 
37Cutler, supra note 2. 
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address comparable misconduct within their own walls. 
Thus, a single enforcement action has the potential to effect 
change on an enormous scale, causing the development or 
enhancement of internal controls, supervisory procedures, 
and compliance functions at hundreds of other companies.   
Moreover, entities have the ability to influence strongly 
the compliance orientation of their own employees. . . . 
Imposing a significant penalty may be the best way for the 
Commission to cause companies to change their cultures 
and to make it in their financial interest to take a proactive 
role in preventing individual misconduct.38 
The claim that Enforcement can “effect change on an enormous 
scale” suggests a larger systemic role than Enforcement historically has 
claimed.39  It also suggests a more nuanced awareness of the role of 
organizational culture than one associates with the traditional, conduct-
preoccupied approach to deterrence.  On closer reading, however, the Cutler 
approach does not stray far from utilitarianism.  The reference to “culture” 
notwithstanding, the approach is still one that is built on a static 
understanding of the firm as proverbial “bad man,” which will only change 
its culture to the extent that doing so is in its financial interest.40  The 
assumption is that optimally-calibrated punishment increases the cost of 
violating the law, and thereby changes the firm’s calculation of the 
advantages of doing so.41  Indeed, such a response does not signify a 
cultural change at all; only an acknowledgement that rational firms must 
learn how to look as though they care about culture, because it is in their 
pecuniary interest to adopt that public stance.  Reform-through-sanctions 
sets up incentives for firms to do nothing more than avoid more sanctions.  
Strategies for avoiding regulatory sanctions are not necessarily coterminous 
                                                 
38Id. (emphasis added).  Mr. Cutler’s view on the role of monetary penalties as punishment, 
when imposed on organizations, comes out less clearly in this speech.  He refers to civil fines 
as “fundamentally a punitive measure intended to enhance deterrence of securities laws 
violations,” and says that their ratcheting up is “driven by two goals: increased accountability 
[for past wrongdoing] and enhanced deterrence.”  It is unclear whether Mr. Cutler intended to 
distinguish between organizational and individual liability with respect to the punitive aspect.   
In any event, he views enterprise liability as operating alongside, not in lieu of, individual 
liability and “gatekeeper” oversight. 
39The charge that the SEC is overreaching its statutory jurisdiction and infringing on 
traditional state powers in the corporate governance arena is outside the scope of this paper.  
See generally, Deborah Solomon, SEC Is Sued Over Fund-Board Rule, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 
2004, at C17.  Also beyond the scope of this paper are worries about the appropriateness of 
potential “backdoor” rulemaking through Enforcement action.  But see infra note 201 and 
accompanying text. 
40See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
41See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985)  (using a recent version of this approach, which 
considers the use of nonmonetary sanctions in deterring criminal behavior). 
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with strategies for identifying root causes and problems, and working to fix 
them.42 
I do not disagree that the in terrorem effect of large but not arbitrary 
monetary sanctions may directly force important changes in the daily 
operations of some rational and self-interested firms.  As such, this kind of 
deterrent may be a sensible, if partial, response to firm wrongdoing, and one 
may hope that it does not fall completely out of favor when dealing with the 
most egregious cases.43  Recent sociolegal work has suggested new ways in 
which “old school” deterrence mechanisms may reinforce good governance 
and promote law-abiding behavior in less linear ways, as well.  This is the 
case for even the least transformative and most mechanical punitive forms—
monetary sanctions, for example—so long as Enforcement’s investigatory 
procedures and processes are generally believed to be fair, its decisions 
reasonable and factually supported, and its conduct demonstrably even-
handed.44  Consider that the enforcement of law, like law itself, serves an 
expressive purpose.45  Firms seek the legitimacy that legal approval confers, 
not only for culturally expressive reasons but also in part because that 
legitimacy can confer tangible benefits, including currency with other 
industry actors.46  Again, insofar as regulator conduct is perceived to be 
credible and proportional, enforcement action can stigmatize businesses vis-
à-vis the public and other companies with whom they wish to do business.47  
                                                 
42See infra, notes 106-18 and accompanying text. 
43See infra, Part 5.  I leave to one side the empirical studies suggesting that deterrent 
mechanisms do not prevent firms, or the individuals operating in them, from violating the 
law.  See, e.g., SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 40 
(2002); SCHLEGEL, supra note 13.  My claim is only that some firms may be directly 
motivated by the fear of sanctions, and that sanctions may also have indirect effects as 
discussed above. 
44Making the same point in the broader criminal context based on psychological studies is 
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).   
45See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); 
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362-
65 (1997). 
46Scholarship on the interaction of law and norms is extensive.  E.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (arguing that corporate 
actors are motivated less by the desire to avoid liability than by the joint effect of social 
norms, and the correlative prospect of financial gain in the market); Mark C. Suchman, 
Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571 
(1995) (arguing that law shapes organizational conduct not only because of law’s cultural 
weight, but also because organizational legitimacy is pragmatically linked to benefits and 
penalties); Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). 
47See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591 (1996) (arguing in favor of “shaming” over incarceration with respect to “white collar” 
criminals); Avitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 1179 
(2003) (describing “network effects” as a mechanism for private ordering and self-
regulation); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (arguing that that Delaware corporate law, as 
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Enforcement action can also serve an error correction function, in that it 
provides an additional set of standards (redundant in places and/or reflecting 
different priorities), which helps to reduce wrongdoing arising from simple 
managerial distraction.48 
Enforcement can also resolve collective action problems where new, 
socially desirable norms are just taking hold.49 For example, an industry’s 
standard practice may violate the securities laws but be so entrenched, and 
perhaps competitively advantageous, that no individual industry actor is 
likely to reject the practice unilaterally.  Legal sanctions can influence this 
type of industry norm.  Especially relevant to industries with such 
entrenched practices is the fact that a well-designed and fairly administered 
enforcement system can help perpetuate an environment where each actor 
believes that other actors are complying with rules—a belief that positively 
correlates with voluntary compliance.50  Even the worst performers will not 
want to be the “last ones out of the pool” if they have the impression that 
norms are changing within their subgroup. 
Keeping the “big stick” of massive sanctions in reserve can also 
buttress other Enforcement demands, including perhaps the demand that a 
firm engage in additional, explicitly forward-looking remedial steps such as 
the Reform Undertaking discussed below.51  There is nothing necessarily 
inconsistent between forward-looking and retrospective Enforcement 
sanctions operating together.  Whether particular forms or conceptions of 
                                                                                                                  
interpreted by courts, is best understood as attempts to create social norms for senior 
managers, directors and the lawyers who advise them). 
48See John T. Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A 
Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283, 303 (1990) 
(analyzing results of six year empirical study of 6,842 manufacturing plants). 
49See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 46, at 968; Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous 
Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL. REV. 1 (2004); 
Clayton Gillette, The Lock-In Effect of Norms, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 813, 832-35 (1998). 
50See  John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing 
Perspective of Deterrence Theory, 60  LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 261-65 (1997) 
(according to Scholz, the belief that others are complying with mutually advantageous rules 
correlates more closely with individual firm compliance than do other factors, such as the 
size of the penalty for violation, which would be more important under a pure deterrence 
model.  Enforcement action can bolster incentives to cooperate voluntarily.  Scholz argues 
that the support function of public enforcement is enhanced where criminal sanctions are 
limited to egregious cases; enforcement procedures are perceived to be fair; substantive rules 
are perceived to be adequate and legitimate; Enforcement targets ‘bad apples’ and gives 
greater deference to compliant firms; and where Enforcement strengthens and encourages 
private enforcement systems (e.g., trade associations)).  See also the “tit-for-tat” literature: 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra 
note 21, at 20-27. 
51See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 39. 
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deterrence, as implemented, undermine a deeper corporate governance 
project is part of the subject examined here.52   
Unfortunately—and this is key—the presence of deterrence-
avoiding conduct, as measured externally for regulatory purposes, does not 
always turn out to be the same thing as the presence of an actual “culture of 
compliance.”  While one may believe that the firm itself is in the best 
position (in the sense of having access to the greatest amount of 
information) to allocate compliance costs in ways that most efficiently 
further its own immediate self-interest, one may not feel confident, for 
reasons of capacity or trust, about leaving such decisions there.  Firms seek 
the benefits that regulatory approval confers, but simultaneously they may 
subvert coercive structures that force conflict with other cherished goals.  If 
adherence to externally-defined facial compliance indicators provides the 
legitimacy-granting rewards they seek, then organizations seeking 
legitimacy may choose to be only facially compliant.  This may be so 
because of conflicting internal commitments,53 because of internal blindness 
to causal factors,54 or because they resist the substantive content of those 
compliance rules.55   
Without attention to the underlying cultural reasons for the 
wrongdoing, one risks sending the message that facial compliance alone can 
avoid sanctions and confer legitimacy on firm conduct.  In the process, one 
reduces the scope for more profound, endogenous cultural change.  What a 
reform-through-massive-sanctions approach signals, more than anything, is 
                                                 
52See infra, Part 5. 
53Some empirical work suggests that managers can satisfy external demands for corporate 
governance reform, while avoiding unwanted compensation risk and loss of autonomy to 
Board members, by adopting but not implementing asked-for governance structures, and by 
bolstering those actions with symbolic language.  See James Westphal & Edward Zajac, The 
Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: 
When Is More Not Better?, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 121 (1994); Edward Zajac & James 
Westphal, Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and 
Symbolism, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 283 (1995).  Analysis of data from over 400 corporations over 
a decade-long period suggests that the stock market reacts positively to symbolic corporate 
governance reforms, even when not implemented, and that the symbolic actions diminish the 
likelihood of some subsequent governance reforms.  James Westphal & Edward Zajac, The 
Symbolic Management of Shareholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder 
Reactions, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 127 (1998). 
54See, e.g., Mark Suchman & Lauren Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New 
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 910-11, 
914-15 (1996) (arguing that both the “rational” and “normative” camps in sociolegal 
literature overvalue conscious reasoning in accounts of why people obey the law); 
BAZERMAN & WATKINS, supra note 13, at 95-119 (describing organizational failures in 
processing information and reacting to it). 
55See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis, 
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 67-68, 79 (Walter Powell 
& Paul DiMaggio, eds., 1991).  
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the regulator’s inability to imagine remedies that can respond directly to the 
culture-based problems that the regulator itself has identified.  Reform-
through-sanctions offloads to the firm, without benefit of regulator support 
or institutional learning, the task of identifying organizational problems and 
identifying solutions.  The firms this paper is most interested in affecting are 
those with the most dysfunctional and/or intransigent cultures—precisely 
the same ones that will not, or are not able to, reorient their own cultures in 
the hoped-for ways through penalty imposition alone.  Deterrence may 
effect change in some situations, but it is not guaranteed to do so.  All of this 
might be acceptable if it were unavoidable, but it is possible to do better, 
within existing structures and regulatory resource constraints.  In the case of 
the worst actors, for whom deterrence has proven to be an insufficient 
driver, regulators and the public need not settle for this sort of wishful, 
black-box56 approach to problems of culture.     
Strikingly, the other trend in recent SEC rhetoric (only accidentally 
served by the trend toward massive deterrence) has been a recognition that 
institutional culture matters because it generates law-abiding and law-
violating conduct, meaning that sanctions against individuals only are 
incomplete as a response to recent corporate and financial sector scandals.57  
To be sure, the SEC recognizes that good corporate culture is the sine qua 
non of good corporate citizenship.  Former SEC Chairman Donaldson’s 
ambitions were wider than seeing compliance programs put in place, or even 
ensuring a law-abiding tone at the top.  He stated that his goal was to 
“enhance and improve corporate governance to help restore the moral DNA 
of entities throughout the U.S. economy.”58  Lori Richards, Director of the 
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, frequently refers 
to the notion of a “culture of compliance.”59  Mr. Cutler spoke at length 
                                                 
56See CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 121 (1975).  In Stone’s language, my 
proposal is “interventionist,” to be distinguished from the “black box” approach.  See also 
Stone, supra note 23, at 28. 
57I am not suggesting that the SEC should focus on corporate culture in lieu of making 
individuals accountable for their wrongdoing, especially at the highest levels of public 
companies and regulated entities.  These are not incompatible approaches.  In addition, this 
culture-oriented approach is not meant to take the place of other structural explanations for 
recent scandals. See e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?  
A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); 
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years 
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 736-37 (2003).  My point is that given the 
SEC’s new awareness of the importance of firm culture, it needs a coherent response to 
problems of that nature.  
58Donaldson, supra note 26.   
59See, e.g., Lori A. Richards, Speech: The Culture of Compliance (Apr. 23, 2003), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042303lar.htm (last visited May 12, 2005) 
(articulating the principles of a “culture of compliance”). 
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about the elements of a law-abiding culture.60  There is a correlation, too, 
between the new focus on organizations, and the new language of cultural 
reform.  This wide-lens approach is new in securities enforcement, although 
it is reminiscent of the kinds of institutional reform-minded remedies 
familiar from public law.61  It remains to be seen whether it will persist 
under Chairman Cox, but public perception of the systemic nature of recent 
scandals certainly suggests a compelling need to continue to speak to those 
concerns. 
“Soft” concepts like “culture” can be hard to pin down, but it is not 
naïve to talk about them.  Nor is it wise to behave as if law enforcement can 
afford to operate without reference to them.  Regulators in a well-
functioning system do not have to anticipate every form that wrongdoing 
can take, or create exhaustive lists of inappropriate conduct, because 
sanction alone is not what keeps the system going.  Because the 
decentralized securities law model puts so much responsibility in the hands 
of regulated entities, its regulators drastically hollow out their own system if 
they profess helplessness—as they effectively do by focusing only on 
massive deterrence in these hardest cases—in the face of deeper issues of 
firm culture.   
I submit that securities law enforcement mechanisms exist that can 
respond to in-firm institutional problems in a more considered way, and one 
that is sensitive to questions of deep organizational culture, without 
requiring massive resource commitment by Enforcement staff.  Moreover, 
such mechanisms can further a level of collective, industry-wide learning 
about compliance that is not accomplished through massive monetary fines 
alone.  These new mechanisms are already being used, in a partial way, by 
the SEC.  I call them the Reform Undertakings.  In other words, in practice 
if not in principle, Enforcement has recognized that the deterrence model is 
not a complete response to problems of firm culture.  In this paper, naming 
the Reform Undertaking phenomenon is partly an attempt to fold the results 
of the SEC’s own on-the-ground learning into its theoretical conception of 
itself and its role. 
                                                 
60See Stephen M. Cutler, Speech: Tone at the Top: Getting it Right (Dec. 3, 2004), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120304smc.htm (last visited May 12, 2005) 
(“Cultivating a culture of compliance requires a sustainable effort. A one-time push is not 
enough. … don’t fall victim to a checklist mentality.”); Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks before 
the 2004 Investment Company Institute Securities Law Developments Conference (Dec. 6, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604smc.htm (last visited May 
12, 2005) (describing the “three Ps” of place, people, and process required to avoid another 
round of scandals). 
61See infra note 62. 
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Administrative Enforcement and Institutional Reform 
Recent work in public law litigation suggests that spurring deep 
change within complex organizational systems requires a broader range of 
tools than the traditional prosecution of rights-based claims provides.  It is 
time to introduce this work to the corporate governance field.   
Almost three decades ago, Abram Chayes described an emerging 
dichotomy between traditional conceptions of adjudication, and an emerging 
judicial role in public law litigation.62  In traditional adjudication, the suit 
involves only the private parties before the court.  It is self-contained and 
party-initiated.  A dispassionate judge identifies the private right at issue 
based on doctrinal analysis and retrospective fact inquiry.  She imposes 
relief, understood as compensation for the past violation of an identifiable 
existing right.  By contrast, in public law litigation, the debate is more about 
the vindication of broader statutory or constitutional policies.  The lawsuit is 
not self-contained.  The judge must manage complex trial situations 
involving not just the parties to the dispute, but also the many and shifting 
parties not before the court who may nevertheless be affected by the suit’s 
outcome.  Fact inquiry is predictive.  Through a combination of party 
negotiation and continuing judicial involvement, the judge fashions relief 
that is ad hoc, ongoing, and prospective.  As such, judges can become 
change agents under whose management specific cases can have far-
reaching effects—not just for their deterrent value, but because the relief 
fashioned focuses squarely on institutional reform. 
The public law adjudicatory model pulls away from traditional 
adversarialism in favor of participatory, forward-looking, non-adversarial 
methods.  Lately, this problem solving approach has become one theme in 
an emerging school of thought known as “new governance,” or 
“experimentalism.”63 This approach identifies ongoing deliberation as both 
                                                 
62See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976).  For  two important theoretical elaborations on the deliberative public law litigation 
model, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 
1365–76 (1991) (developing a deliberative model for remedial decisionmaking); and Charles 
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (using case study narratives to illustrate a theoretical model 
of structural reform through public law litigation). 
63I am glossing over noteworthy distinctions in speaking of experimentalism and New 
Governance together.  Other terms for similar approaches include “reflexive law,” 
“responsive regulation,” and “network governance.”  New Governance has emerged as a 
global term to refer to this set of approaches.  Within it, experimentalism (an approach 
associated with, among others, Charles Sabel, Michael Dorf, Bradley Karkkainen, James 
Liebman, and William H. Simon) may be distinctive for its Deweyan pragmatist arguments in 
favor of decentralized decisionmaking in the service of broader social goals, and for the 
comprehensiveness of its description of the “rolling best practices rulemaking” needed to 
track progress toward those goals.  Susan Sturm shares the emphases on pragmatism, 
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the most legitimate, and most effective, mechanism for making decisions in 
complex organizational structures.  The deliberation is accomplished by 
decentralized, broadly participatory stakeholder groups that can access local 
knowledge and context-specific understandings of a situation.  
Decisionmaking within the groups is buttressed by explicit reason-giving, 
based on reference to identified norms rather than pure exchange.  A 
centralized information-gathering body aggregates experience and permits 
comparative learning.  It is a “learning by doing” structure, meaning that 
groups continually revise both ends and their own process through their 
participation in it.  Transparency and accountability, including 
accountability for adhering to non-negotiable participatory norms, are 
reinforced by the centralized comparative data analysis function.64 
In spite of worries about courts’ capacity and legitimacy in working 
larger institutional reform,65 the new methods show promise.  Civil rights 
advocates, using public law litigation, have had some significant successes 
in “destabilizing” failing institutions and reforming practices in areas such 
as public school administration, mental health institutions, prison 
management, responses to systemic police abuse, public housing,66 and 
health care provision.67  Novel court structures have also emerged as part of 
the recognition that complex social problems are not always best resolved in 
a (stereotypically) atomistic and adversarial environment.68 
Beyond court action, and operating very much across the traditional 
public law/private law divide, New Governance theorists are also 
reorienting conversation about employment discrimination,69 environmental 
                                                                                                                  
demonstrably reasoned decisionmaking practices, and centralized comparative learning, but 
see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 555 (2001).  For a conversation about the current state of play, see 
generally  Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); and Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
“New Governance” in Legal Thought and In the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to 
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004). 
64See Sturm, supra note 62, at 1427-1444; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345-56 (1998). 
65See Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1017-19. 
66See Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1022-53.  Unlike Chayes, Sabel & Simon do not 
believe the new public law litigation techniques signal a break with the older adjudicative 
model.  Id. at 1056-62. 
67See Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for 
Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
68See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and 
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. 
Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1501 (2003). Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 936-953 (2003). 
69See generally Sturm, supra note 63. 
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regulation,70 public school administration,71  international labor standards,72 
and regulation generally.73   The most provocative proposals argue for the 
application of deliberative, pragmatic “democratic experimentalist” methods 
to constitutional law and jurisprudence.74  What makes the model attractive 
in securities law enforcement is not only its willingness to address head-on 
(albeit through incremental means) the challenge of reforming complex 
institutions, but also its somewhat unexpected success across a wide range 
of other, apparently intractable, problems. 
The Unique Enforcement Environment 
I began this section with a reference to courts, rather than regulators, 
because the idealized traditional adjudication model shares features—and 
related worries—with the common view of the enforcement function as 
retrospective and self-contained.  Unlike courts or regulators, however, there 
has been little academic attention focused on the potential of enforcement 
bodies (i.e., the administrative law analog to the criminal law prosecutor) to 
force New Governance-style change.75  First impressions may suggest some 
conceptual tension between the traditional enforcement role and the New 
Governance approach, but I argue that reform-oriented solutions can be 
embedded within the enforcement function, in particular in securities law 
enforcement.  There can be broad overlap between retrospective and 
                                                 
70See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Bradley 
C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2000); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Environmental 
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002). 
71See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: 
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 183 (2003). 
72See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? (2001). 
73See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (1997); and, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); 
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 
(2003). 
74See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64; Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, 
Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261 (2004); Michael C. Dorf, 
Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); Cristie L. 
Ford, In Search of the Qualitative Clear Majority: Democratic Experimentalism and the 
Quebec Secession Reference, 39 ALBERTA L. REV. 511 (2001); JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING 
INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2002) (preferring the term “reflexive law” and not 
necessarily aligning herself explicitly with democratic experimentalism). 
75But see MALCOLM SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING 
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE (2000) (identifying changes in internal enforcement 
approaches, from customer service- and process-oriented to problem solving, in the mid to 
late 1990s). 
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prospective approaches, to the benefit of both enforcement and corporate 
governance reform.76 
To be clear, though, two things make this situation different from 
the idealized public law litigation context.  First, these cases settle.  Second, 
enforcement staff does the settling, and brings to the process its own 
particular culture and orientation.  Each of these attributes puts significant 
torque on the New Governance model. 
Settlements provide obvious resource conservation benefits, but 
they impose a cost in terms of lost transparency.  Firms settling regulatory 
actions can keep aspects of their internal wrongdoing out of the public eye 
by resolving matters before full-blown trial.  They can be expected to 
leverage their greater knowledge of what went wrong, and to try to settle 
before all the facts emerge, precisely to avoid a more thorough investigation.  
This reduces public, regulatory, and judicial learning about violation 
patterns more generally.  In fact, firms can resolve matters with prosecutors 
before even the (overworked) prosecutors have a complete sense of the 
depth of the problem.  Because of their informational advantage, firms can 
also assess the likely penalty range better than enforcement can.  Settlement 
can even be a way for firms themselves to avoid facing the pervasiveness of 
their corporate governance problems.  Sanctions meted out in settlements 
may therefore be poorly suited to responding to the most serious problems.  
At the aggregate level, as well, the opacity can make enforcement’s forceful 
“culture of compliance” message seem less convincing.  Individuals, 
including those leading organizations, are more likely to abide by rules they 
perceive as legitimate and procedurally fair.77  Therefore, enforcement 
mechanisms that are not transparent may lack demonstrable credibility, 
which in turn may undermine tendencies toward law-abiding behavior.  As 
discussed below,78 given SEC Enforcement’s settlement framework, 
onlookers may be right to be cynical about whether broader corporate 
governance priorities are being advanced behind the concealing curtain of 
settlement. 
The second key difference here is that Enforcement staff, not courts, 
are the primary arbiters of these settlements.  As change agents, the 
enforcement arms of administrative regulators are much understudied.  
Enforcement in particular has not garnered much attention from New 
Governance theorists.  This may be because the enforcement process has 
been seen, rightly or wrongly, to have become fossilized into an old-
fashioned prosecutorial form based on retrospective and blame-oriented 
                                                 
76See infra, Part 5. 
77See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
78Infra Part 2. 
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decisionmaking.79  Perhaps, because they have been able to offload systemic 
impact questions to the regulatory arms of their agencies, enforcement 
divisions have not been pushed toward a more public-regarding stance to the 
degree that courts have. 
Having enforcement personnel focus on broader systemic reform 
has implications.  To begin with, relative to regulators, the enforcer’s task is 
retrospective and blame-oriented, not prospective and reform-oriented.  The 
liability model on which enforcement/prosecution is based serves a 
legitimate social function in signaling public norms, and those norms affect 
the conduct of other actors.  While blame is only one kind of possible 
deterrence, its shaming effects can provide a coercive “stick,” external to the 
regulatory process, to reinforce law-abiding behavior.80  At the same time, 
blame-ascribing models tend to be better suited to individuals than to 
organizations.  Blame-oriented models struggle with how to respond to the 
corporate form, although the basic intuition—that blame allocation is an 
important part of a regulatory system—has not been dislodged.81   
Enforcement action provides a mechanism by which the firm, and 
the larger market, can digest and move beyond acute instances of 
wrongdoing.  It serves a legitimate purpose in achieving closure, which 
reduces downward pressure on stock valuation (to the benefit of current 
shareholders), allows the firm to emerge intact as a productive business 
entity and employer, and prevents an escalation into a larger industry or 
                                                 
79According to Sparrow, this is how proponents of former President Clinton’s customer-
oriented National Performance Review regulatory model (an early and incomplete, but still 
noteworthy, New Governance form) viewed the enforcement function.  See SPARROW, supra 
note 75, at 49-64. 
80See infra notes 218-222 and accompanying text (comparing shaming/blaming punishments 
to the information-forcing coercive mechanism imagined in experimentalist regulation). 
81For interesting recent comments on the normative problems with allocating blame and 
criminal liability for corporations, see generally Gilbert Geis & Joseph F.C. DiMento, 
Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 341 (2002); SIMPSON, supra note 43; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence, in 
GRAÍNNE DE BURCA & JOANNE SCOTT, EDS., NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
EUROPE AND THE U.S. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 9-11, on file with author).  A 
bibliography covering both legal and social science resources from the late 19th century 
through early 2001 is Joseph F.C. DiMento et al., Corporate Criminal Liability: A 
Bibliography, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000-2001).  Causation and individual intent can also 
be hard to prove within complex organizational contexts.  Contra JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1984) (arguing that on the whole, 
corporate wrongdoing is pursued for organizational, not individual, ends).  For a theory of 
organizational jurisprudence arguing that forward-looking regulation is appropriate when 
adjudicating controversies involving organizations such as large corporations (and that 
retrospective, individualistic arbitration is appropriate when adjudicating controversies 
involving individuals), see MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A 
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986). 
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market crisis.82  If the goal is to spur institutional reform, however, the 
downsides to this closure orientation are twofold.  First, within the process, 
the closure-oriented model seems incapable of making space for the kinds of 
deep and broad, time-intensive and often difficult self-examinations that a 
real cultural shift would require.83  On the contrary, the focus on closure is 
likely to stimulate end-game strategic responses from firms.  The most one 
could hope for would be compliance with externally imposed rules, meant to 
channel firm action within certain bounds.  Second, at the institutional level, 
the fact that enforcement actions are time-limited means there may be no 
aggregation of institutional knowledge about governance problems.  
Enforcers as a group may not get better at predicting problems, identifying 
risk factors, or developing workable remedies over time.84   
Similarly, the Enforcement-firm relationship is not geared toward 
ongoing, trusting collaboration.  Like prosecutors, Enforcement’s 
relationship with firms being investigated will, by definition, be adversarial 
and suspicious.  This is not to say that they want to see firms harmed.  
Individual Enforcement staff may be agnostic on the overall goodwill of 
market actors, or they may believe that every firm will do anything it can get 
away with, or they may believe that most firms act responsibly and their job 
is to weed out the “bad apples.”  Yet in all cases they are institutionally 
charged with remaining suspicious of their actual targets and skeptical about 
unsubstantiated promises.  If they were not, we would be concerned about 
agency capture.   
Finally, even if Enforcement culture were less retrospective, blame-
oriented, closure-oriented, and suspicious, Enforcement does not have the 
institutional resources needed to engage in the kind of open-minded, 
systemically oriented, ongoing process that most experts in change 
management say are necessary to destabilize entrenched routines and 
achieve real change.  Entire industries are devoted to such tasks.  In order to 
address this kind of problem, Enforcement staff would first have to figure 
out what cultural problems exist.  This would require a sufficiently deep 
understanding of the complex interplay of reporting lines, personalities, 
history, and acculturation that create firm culture.  Then, the same non-
                                                 
82I am not speaking of that exceedingly rare firm that is so “rotten” that the only course must 
be to shut it down.  See infra notes 213-216 and accompanying text. 
83On the difference in institutional culture between government lawyers and social scientists 
such as economists (in terms of lawyers’ preference for circumscribed sets of provable facts 
over broader systemic analysis), see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 61-61 (1989).  
84See also HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990) (arguing, in the police 
context, that rather than merely trying to solve crimes after they are committed, the police 
should study crime patterns in order to identify underlying conditions that stimulate the 
commission of crimes, and then move proactively to eliminate them).  
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expert staffers would have to develop context-appropriate responses that 
were as pervasive and elastic as the culture they seek to supplant.   
Even without trying to effect large-scale cultural changes, 
Enforcement resources are stretched to an almost unmanageable degree.  
Enforcement settles the vast majority of its actions, not only for all the usual 
settlement reasons but also because it could not effectively prosecute them 
all.  Certainly, it could not prosecute all the cases it is investigating at any 
one time, but the point goes further: it takes enormous resources to get to the 
bottom of the kinds of large and complex securities cases that are being 
brought routinely in recent years.85  According to one report from mid-2002, 
SEC Enforcement was so overwhelmed that “evidence rooms on the 8th and 
9th floors of the SEC’s downtown Washington headquarters [were] so full 
that boxes of subpoenaed documents [were] stacked in hallways,” and Mr. 
Cutler himself admitted that his staff was “stretched to the limit.”86  The 
SEC Enforcement model—perhaps like the prosecutorial model generally— 
was not designed to conduct the kinds of massive document reviews, factual 
investigations, and informational analysis needed to understand the myriad 
facets of a particular act of firm wrongdoing, let alone to fashion systemic 
solutions to cultural problems.   
Nor do I think that increasing Enforcement resources to allow 
staffers to undertake “deep” scrutiny is the solution.  Enforcement staff 
should not be transformed into corporate governance consultants.  Recent 
                                                 
85Enforcement subpoenas and requests for documents in the post-Enron era tend to be  
broadly worded and to compel vast swaths of data including general business documents, 
email and instant messaging records, and financial and account systems information.  See, 
e.g., Barry B. Burr, First time: Consultants under the gun with SEC probe; ‘Pay-to-
play’ allegations spur sweeping, detailed investigation, 32 PENSIONS & INV. 1 (Jan. 12, 
2004).  For one leading East Coast document management firm, the average regulatory 
document production project involves about 100,000 documents.  At the upper end, the firm 
has processed more than 3 million documents, resulting in about 10 million pages, in a single 
case.  It has produced 250,000 documents – in excess of one million pages – to a law firm in 
a single day.  E-mail from Jay McNally, CEO, Ibis Consulting, Inc., to Cristie Ford (June 13, 
2005) (on file with author).  Of course, after being individually reviewed by lawyers, those 
documents are produced to regulators at a distinctly more human pace.  Nevertheless, 
Enforcement is ill-equipped to handle this kind of volume, provided to them at first instance 
(per their request and in keeping with the firm’s work product privilege) as a largely 
undifferentiated mass of data.  As New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s office has 
shown, even small teams of enforcers may be able to bring firms to the settlement table.  See 
Richard Thomson, America’s Celebrity Prosecutors: Chasing the white collar crooks puts 
top lawyers on the glory trail, EVENING STANDARD (U.K.), June 13, 2003, at 42 (noting 
Spitzer’s investigation of stock analysts involved hundreds of thousands of documents and 
emails and was handled by only four lawyers); Michael Schroeder, Stock Analysis: States’ 
Wall Street Probes Bog Down, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at C5.  This does not necessarily 
imply that those enforcers have a comprehensive picture of the information produced to them. 
86Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Imperfect Guardian: SEC Faces Hurdles Beyond Low 
Budget In Stopping Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A1. 
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increases in the SEC’s budget allocation from Congress,87 and a recent push 
to make the SEC more technically adept at handling the information it does 
receive,88 only tinker around the edges of a fundamental mismatch between 
institutional design and information volume.89  One can scarcely imagine 
how an agency facing this kind of information burden could assume 
additional responsibility for understanding and working to resolve pervasive 
cultural problems among firms being investigated.  If the goal is nothing 
more than to resolve cases as expeditiously as possible, Enforcement can 
make significant progress through individual interviews or depositions and a 
sufficient number of key documents.  But one can understand why, 
aspirational proclamations aside, Enforcement staff might take a deterrence-
based approach to trying to further institutional reform.  Irrespective of any 
faith in that approach, they are not in a position to do much more.   
Because Enforcement does not have the resources, the mandate, the 
necessary culture, or the appropriate relationship to organizations to effect 
meaningful organizational change, they may “satisfice”90 in three ways: 
first, as discussed above, they revert to a “black box” deterrence approach to 
the securities laws.  In other words, they may impose severe monetary fines, 
declining to engage in any follow up to determine whether progress is made, 
and depriving themselves of an important learning opportunity in the 
process.  The second and third ways in which they satisfice relate to the 
ways in which an organization may bid for leniency during settlement 
negotiations.  Specifically, SEC Enforcement will settle with firms on 
favorable terms, even including taking no sanctioning action at all, in 
exchange for either of two things: (a) indicia that the firm has an adequate 
compliance regime in place; and (b) firm cooperation with Enforcement 
after an investigation has been initiated.   
                                                 
87See SEC, 2004-2009 Strategic Plan, 22, 27 (Aug. 5, 2004), available at  
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan0409.pdf (last visited May 12, 2005) (showing that 
over the last several years, the SEC’s Congressional budget allocation has increased 
significantly, growing from $514 million in fiscal 2002 to $811.5 in fiscal 2004); Anna Wilde 
Mathews et al., The Bush Budget Proposal: FDA, FCC Get Rare Boosts, While SEC Funding 
Is Stable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2005, at A14 (reporting President Bush has requested $863 
million for the SEC in fiscal 2006, up only slightly from the fiscal 2005 figure of $857 
million).   
88See SEC, 2004-2009 Stategic Plan, supra note 87, at 32-33, 48-50 (announcing new staff 
training initiatives and new or expanded automated information management tools). 
89I am speaking primarily of Enforcement, but even in the normal regulatory course, the 
SEC is expected to manage an enormous information volume.  See Schroeder & Ip, supra 
note 86; see also “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs,” 
Report of the Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Oct. 8, 2002), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/100702watchdogsreport.pdf (last visited 
May 12, 2005). 
90The term refers to resolutions that may be good enough in the circumstances (i.e., wherein 
goals are somewhere between “satisfied” and “sacrificed,”), but that are not optimal.  
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957). 
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If the presence of compliance programs and cooperation with 
Enforcement staff were positively and substantially correlated with good 
corporate governance/citizenship, then it would make sense to extend 
leniency on these terms.  On the other hand, this settlement approach is ill-
advised if there is no such correlation, or the correlation is weak.  
Settlements reached on this basis would not constitute wise husbandry of 
scarce enforcement resources, but rather arbitrary grants of leniency without 
regard to the potential that that firm may commit or permit more 
wrongdoing in the future.  It would be even more discouraging if enforcers 
suspected (as they might) that there is no clear correlation between the bases 
for leniency and good corporate citizenship, but—because impossible 
information volumes leave them with an tenuous grasp on their cases, or 
because they are resigned to the system’s imperfections—believe they have 
no choice but to settle on such face-saving terms.  Especially in the 
nontransparent settlement context, such a practice could degenerate into a 
“trading of favors,” insincere and unverifiable demonstrations of 
compliance, and the potential failure of due process for individuals.  In the 
section that follows, I argue that these are precisely the problems presented 
by the SEC’s settlement guidelines, known as the Framework for 
Cooperation. 
The other alternative, the Reform Undertaking model,91 recognizes 
that Enforcement’s purpose is not to get to the root of a systemic corporate 
governance problem on its own, even if those are the problems that it needs 
to address.  Nevertheless, it constitutes the Enforcement action as an 
intervention that is far more engaged than the one contemplated by 
deterrence alone.  The Reform Undertaking model involves an independent 
third party consultant to help the organization address its own governance 
problems, over a longer period of time, and after the immediate enforcement 
action has been provisionally resolved.  In this way, Reform Undertakings 
uncouple the catalyst-for-reform of the enforcement action from the 
specifics of reform measures.  This reduces some of the pressure toward 
strategic action, and if properly implemented can create an environment 
more conducive to fostering meaningful positive culture change. 
2.  Problems With the Framework for Cooperation 
The discussion in Part One, above, describes the limitations of the 
Donaldson-era SEC’s deterrence-based strategy in meeting the agency’s 
stated intention of spurring institutional reform, and suggests that a New 
Governance-style approach may be better suited to the task.  It identifies 
some challenges, relative to other New Governance initiatives, arising from 
                                                 
91See Infra Part 3 (explaining the Reform Undertaking model as one that uses enforcement to 
further, but not to define or manage, more profound institutional reform). 
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the Enforcement-driven and settlement-oriented environment.  I return to 
those below, and make recommendations for a incorporating a version of 
New Governance problem solving into real-life enforcement.92  However, 
deterrence is only half the picture.  Enforcement has stated that certain “core 
factors” influence the decision as to quantum of penalty, or even whether to 
impose a penalty at all.  The factor that often proves decisive in their 
analysis is the extent of a violator’s cooperation, as measured by the 
standards set forth in the [Framework for Cooperation].93  The Framework 
for Cooperation effectively sets out the indicia that a firm must demonstrate 
to obtain leniency from Enforcement.  It is an integral part of the 
nontransparent settlement dance described above, and its structure and 
rationale should be of concern to those aspiring to foster improved corporate 
governance standards through SEC Enforcement action. 
The SEC Framework for Cooperation 
On October 23, 2001, as part of an Exchange Act Section 21(a) 
Report, the Commission released a “Framework for Evaluating Cooperation 
in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion.”94  Like the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s 1991 Organizational Sentencing Guidelines on which it was 
loosely modeled, the Framework for Cooperation settlement approach can 
be boiled down to two basic requirements.  In order to obtain leniency, the 
firm must demonstrate (1) that it has in place compliance mechanisms 
designed to prevent and detect violations of law within the firm (“credit-for-
compliance”), and (2) that it has cooperated with authorities after apparent 
wrongdoing has been uncovered (“credit-for-cooperation”).95  As a practical 
                                                 
92See Infra Part 5 (concluding that a coherent hybridity between experimentalism and 
securities law enforcement structures can, and should, exist). 
93See Cutler, supra note 2 (highlighting that cooperation is the third and often the decisive 
one of three core factors).  The first two are the type of violation committed (i.e., fraud or 
non-fraud, although non-fraud cases can also attract monetary penalties), and the degree of 
harm resulting from the violations as measured by harm to investors, effect on market 
capitalization, and/or harm to public trust and confidence.  I fold these factors into my 
definition of the “worst actors,” above.   
94See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement 
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter the Framework for 
Cooperation], at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (explaining that the 
word “prosecution” here refers to SEC Staff attorneys working in the Enforcement Division); 
Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of the Task Force on Exchange Act Section 21(a) 
Written Statements, 59 BUS. LAW. 531 (2004) (outlining the recent history of the use of the 
Section 21(a) Report). 
95U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 et seq. (2004).  The Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines imposed a mandatory sentencing calculus on federal court judges 
dealing with corporate and white collar crime.   Those guidelines remain, at a minimum, 
persuasive in the wake of the Supreme Court’s rulings on the constitutionality of federal 
individual sentencing guidelines, in U.S. v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).  See also United 
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matter, the Framework for Cooperation provides Enforcement with a 
shortcut that allows it to avoid sorting through all the intricacies of the 
complex and information-heavy investigations it brings.  In the process, 
though, it has the potential to undermine efforts toward corporate 
governance reform. 
According to the Press Release accompanying the Framework, a 
firm’s cooperation with SEC Enforcement staff will be measured along four 
broad measures.96  They are: (1) Self-policing prior to the discovery of the 
misconduct, including establishing effective compliance procedures and an 
appropriate tone at the top; (2) Self-reporting of misconduct when it is 
discovered, including conducting a thorough review of the nature, extent, 
origins and consequences of the misconduct, as well as promptly, 
completely, and effectively disclosing the misconduct to the public, to 
regulators, and to self-regulators; (3) Remediation, including dismissing or 
appropriately disciplining wrongdoers, modifying and improving internal 
controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of the misconduct, and 
appropriately compensating those adversely affected; and  (4) Cooperation 
with law enforcement authorities, including providing the Commission staff 
with all information relevant to the underlying violations and the company’s 
remedial efforts.97 
The Framework’s structure and language show the influence of SEC 
Enforcement culture and imperatives.  It lists 13 criteria for Enforcement 
                                                                                                                  
States Sentencing Commission, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/advgrprpt.htm; 
John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior – The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit, 1317 PLI / CORP 113, 115-26 (2002).  Federal criminal 
prosecutors have also used the Guidelines as an informal roadmap for cases involving 
business organizations.  See also Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. 
Holder, Jr., to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal 
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html; Memorandum from Deputy 
Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Department Components, United States 
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), 
http:// www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (recognizing that federal criminal 
prosecutors have also used the Guidelines as an informal roadmap for cases involving 
business organizations).  The Framework, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and 
their other progeny also ask whether the firm has appropriately compensated those adversely 
affected by the alleged wrongdoing.  This important criterion is not directly relevant to this 
analysis of firm culture and pathologies in regulatory settlements, but remediation 
requirements could certainly be a component of a True Reform Undertaking structure; see 
infra, Part 5. 
96Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and Statement Setting Forth 
Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 23, 
2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/prosdiscretion.htm (asserting that credit for 
cooperation may range from no enforcement action at all, to bringing reduced charges). 
97See id.  
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staffers to consider in determining whether, and how much, to credit self-
policing, self-reporting, remediation, and cooperation.  Relative to the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which attempt to articulate general 
standards against which to measure a firm’s compliance program,98 the 
purpose of the Framework for Cooperation is to specify in clear terms how 
firms can obtain leniency.  For this reason, the Framework’s language is 
prescriptive—almost forensic—and focused on the acute wrongdoing 
instance rather than on broader corporate governance indicia. 
The only way to convey the Framework’s tenor is to quote the 
relevant criteria in full.  The eight criteria relevant to this discussion99 are 
divided along the following lines: three evaluate prior conditions and good 
governance mechanisms in the firm; four evaluate the firm’s response to the 
wrongdoing; and one specifically addresses the firm’s cooperation with 
Staff.  The three criteria that evaluate prior conditions and/or good 
governance ask: 
2. How did the misconduct arise? Is it the result of pressure 
placed on employees to achieve specific results, or a tone of 
lawlessness set by those in control of the company? What 
                                                 
98The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines have been compared to the United States 
Constitution, in that they contain “simple statements of general principles that permit its [sic] 
application to varied and changing circumstances.”  Judge Diana E. Murphy, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 
1291 PLI/CORP 97, 110 (Feb 2002).  Thus, the Guidelines’ definition of “an effective 
program to prevent and detect violations of law” is intended to evolve based on best practices 
and ongoing learning within the firm about its own risk factors and vulnerabilities.  The 
Guidelines do not define such an “effective program,” except to say that it is a program that 
has been “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be 
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”  While the precise actions necessary 
for an “effective program” depend upon a number of factors, the likelihood that certain 
offenses may occur because of the nature of a firm’s business is relevant.  The “hallmark” of 
such a program is that “the organization exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent and 
detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents.”  Words such as “effective,” 
“reasonable,” and “due diligence” signal a degree of discretion in deciding what constitutes a 
good compliance program.  The definition of “due diligence” itself is general and contains 
many open and subjective words.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, 
cmt. n.3(k) et seq. (2004).  Of course, the Guidelines are hardly an improvement over the 
Framework to the extent that they require judges and/or prosecutors to evaluate firms’ 
compliance systems, just as the Framework requires Enforcement staff to do it. 
99The other five criteria speak more to the allocation of scarce Enforcement resources.  Four 
criteria assess severity of conduct and magnitude of harm, and go to proportionality of 
punishment-versus-crime, rather than to leniency per se.  Framework for Cooperation, supra 
note 94, at criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5.  The final criterion asks whether the company is “the same 
company in which the misconduct occurred, or [whether it has] changed through a merger or 
bankruptcy reorganization.”  Id. at criterion 13.  While these are all valid considerations, they 
are concerned with the cost-benefit analysis of pursuing Enforcement action against certain 
firms, rather than with cooperation, compliance, or culture.  See supra notes 24-25 and 
accompanying text. 
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compliance procedures were in place to prevent the 
misconduct now uncovered? Why did those procedures fail 
to stop or inhibit the wrongful conduct?100 
6. How was the misconduct detected and who uncovered it?  
12. What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to 
recur? Did the company adopt and ensure enforcement of 
new and more effective internal controls and procedures 
designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct? Did the 
company provide our staff with sufficient information for it 
to evaluate the company’s measures to correct the situation 
and ensure that the conduct does not recur?101  
The four criteria that evaluate the firm’s response in the period after 
wrongdoing has been alleged are concerned with compliance, but also with 
damage control.  They ask: 
7. How long after discovery of the misconduct did it take to 
implement an effective response?  
8. What steps did the company take upon learning of the 
misconduct? Did the company immediately stop the 
misconduct? Are persons responsible for any misconduct 
still with the company? If so, are they still in the same 
positions? Did the company promptly, completely and 
effectively disclose the existence of the misconduct to the 
public, to regulators and to self-regulators? Did the 
company cooperate completely with appropriate regulatory 
and law enforcement bodies? Did the company identify 
what additional related misconduct is likely to have 
occurred? Did the company take steps to identify the extent 
of damage to investors and other corporate constituencies? 
Did the company appropriately recompense those adversely 
affected by the conduct?  
9. What processes did the company follow to resolve many 
of these issues and ferret out necessary information? Were 
the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors fully 
informed? If so, when?  
                                                 
100Recent Commission speeches make it clear that after-the-fact cleanup exercises are no 
substitute for pre-existing good governance practices.  According to Commissioner Cynthia 
Glassman, “if you are looking for leniency you had better be able to show that you cared 
about preventing corporate misconduct before you discover that it occurred.”  Commissioner 
Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Idea of ‘Good’ Governance (Sept. 27, 
2002) at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch586.htm. 
101See Framework for Cooperation, supra note 94, at criteria 2, 6, and 12. 
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10. Did the company commit to learn the truth, fully and 
expeditiously? Did it do a thorough review of the nature, 
extent, origins and consequences of the conduct and related 
behavior? Did management, the Board or committees 
consisting solely of outside directors oversee the review? 
Did company employees or outside persons perform the 
review? If outside persons, had they done other work for the 
company? Where the review was conducted by outside 
counsel, had management previously engaged such 
counsel? Were scope limitations placed on the review? If 
so, what were they?102  
These four criteria have a lot to do with the firm’s ex post 
cooperation, but there is also one explicit cooperation criterion.  It asks: 
11. Did the company promptly make available to our staff 
the results of its review and provide sufficient 
documentation reflecting its response to the situation? Did 
the company identify possible violative conduct and 
evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate prompt 
enforcement actions against those who violated the law? 
Did the company produce a thorough and probing written 
report detailing the findings of its review? Did the company 
voluntarily disclose information our staff did not directly 
request and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did the 
company ask its employees to cooperate with our staff and 
make all reasonable efforts to secure such cooperation?103 
The cooperation criterion is the most immediately alarming for 
those concerned with due process, safeguarding the attorney client privilege, 
and an adversarial process permitting zealous defense of clients.  The 
Framework makes it clear that SEC Enforcement expects value-added firm 
participation in its investigation, not just prompt and adequate responses to 
Enforcement demands.  In other words, along with making documents and 
witnesses available, the firm is expected to identify possible violations and 
evidence proactively; to produce a thorough and probing written report and 
make it available to Enforcement; and to bring information that 
Enforcement might not otherwise have uncovered to its attention.104   
While the credit-for-cooperation requirements raise the most 
pressing concerns, on further reflection the credit-for-compliance 
                                                 
102See Framework for Cooperation, supra note 94, at criteria 7-10.  
103See Framework for Cooperation, supra note 94, at criterion 11.   
104In the criminal context, a similar provision has caused anxiety for at least one observer, 
who notes that some practitioners think the government is “laz[y]” and “hitch[ing] a free 
ride” on defense counsel’s work.  Gibeaut, supra note 6, at 49. 
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requirements do not fare much better.  The problem is that neither ex post 
cooperation with Enforcement, nor the presence of compliance programs, 
are necessarily proxies for good firm culture.  The Framework model also 
presumes that firm compliance programs (or, more accurately, firms’ 
representations about them) can readily be evaluated by regulators.  This 
may not be the case.  In fact, the Framework criteria relating to compliance 
may even reflect the SEC’s desire to avoid having to evaluate flexible, 
context specific standards for compliance programs in the interest of 
finality.  Moreover, the Framework ignores the degree to which cooperation 
with authorities after wrongdoing has been uncovered can turn into horse-
trading and scapegoating.  As a result, both credit-for-compliance and 
credit-for-cooperation create incentive structures that can undermine, rather 
than support, a theoretically ideal enforcement pyramid. 
“Cynical Happy-Talk”: The Problem with Credit-for-Compliance   
Good corporate governance is a hard thing to measure.  
Enforcement staff is not equipped to identify or wrestle with the attendant 
issues at any depth.  Thoroughly understanding a firm’s compliance 
structure and culture would require going through vast quantities of 
documents and information during an investigation, and then applying 
relatively specialized knowledge about compliance—two functions that 
Enforcement staff has neither the time nor the expertise to perform.  
Moreover, even among experts the notion of an “effective program to 
prevent and detect violations of law” is constantly changing, vague at the 
margins, and subject to dispute.  Enforcement staff faced with the prospect 
of plumbing the depths of a compliance program for purposes of extending 
leniency may avoid the problem in a few different ways.  They may choose 
to define “compliance” in a flattened way, or they may avoid defining it 
entirely. 
The obvious temptation (or obvious, at least, to those familiar with 
the history of command-and-control regulation in this country) is to define 
the essentialized “effective compliance program” to a high gloss of 
certainty, even at the cost of being optimally effective from a long term risk 
management or good governance perspective.  Enforcement staff could try 
to evaluate firm compliance according to a checklist, rather than in a flexible 
or empirically based way.105  Checklists are simpler to work with, and 
                                                 
105The similarity with discredited command-and-control administrative mechanisms, the 
stereotypical example of which requires regulated entities to meet detailed and rigid, 
learning-resistant process criteria, is striking.  It brings to mind the literature on bounded 
rationality suggesting that, when confronted with overwhelming complexity, people tend to 
rely on cognitive shortcuts such as heuristics and schema as a way of managing the universe 
of possibilities.  See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., EDS., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 
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provide a degree of clarity for both firm and overworked Enforcement 
staffer.  However, rigid, anticipatory rules have limited range for compelling 
systemic scrutiny or good behavior.  For example, contemporary compliance 
scholarship considers having an independent board of directors to be a 
crucial step in safeguarding shareholders and the public against managerial 
self-interest.106  The presence of a code of ethics is also an important 
component.107  Yet, in an empirical study of 221 large- and medium-sized 
U.S. corporations, James Westphal found that changes in board structure 
that increase the board’s independence from management are associated 
with higher levels of CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior toward 
board members, and that such influence behaviors offset the effect of 
increased structural board independence.108  Corporate codes of ethics have 
also been criticized as being ineffective.109  Relying on shallow tests for 
                                                                                                                  
(1982); Jeffrey Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government 
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002) (applying a cognitive model to regulatory design).  
As Troy Paredes has noted, people make bad decisions when the volume of information 
increases, and they are forced to apply simpler analytical tools.  See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded 
by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 
WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 434-43 (2003) (discussing investors’ “information overload” and 
mandatory disclosure system in securities laws). 
106The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related new self regulatory organization rules 
emphasize the importance of a strong and independent board of directors, with certain 
committees of the board either a majority or completely comprised of independent directors.   
The Act creates extensive protections for Audit Committees in particular, including the 
requirement that Audit Committee members be independent of the company, and that at least 
one member of the Audit Committee be a “financial expert.”  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265.  The Act gives the Audit Committee sole responsibility for 
appointing, compensating and supervising auditors, and requires the Audit Committee to set 
up internal procedures for receiving and reacting to complaints concerning accounting, 
internal control, or auditing matters, including establishing a mechanism for handling 
confidential, anonymous concerns of employees.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1.  See also Self Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48745, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 64,154, 64,157-59, 64,161-64 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.   
107See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (defining the code of ethics as 
among other things, honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or 
apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships); see also Self 
Regulatory Organizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,159, 64,164 (Nov. 12, 2003) (explaining the code 
of business conduct and ethics). 
108See James D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board 
Independence from Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511, 529-532 (1998) (explaining, for 
instance, that increases in structural board independence lead to larger subsequent increases 
in CEO compensation by increasing the level of CEO interpersonal influence behavior).   
109See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s 
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 120-21 (2005) (citing the Enron’s Board of Directors 
actions in waiving company code of ethics so that Enron’s CFO could participate in the LJM-
related party transactions, conflict of interest notwithstanding); see also Note, The Good, The 
Bad, and Their Compliance Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with 
Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123 (2003) (asserting that a corporate code 
of ethics is only as good as the directors and officers responsible for implementing it). 
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board independence, then, fails to account for the undoubtedly nuanced 
relationship between board independence and good corporate citizenship.110  
Part of the problem is that procedural outputs (e.g., internal reports 
generated, number of compliance officers on staff, the installation of a 24-
hour anonymous whistleblower hotline, etc.) are easier to measure than high 
level compliance outcomes.  In fact, relatively easy-to-measure outputs are 
even likely to receive more attention than hard-to-measure outputs.111  One 
can understand how observers might be cynical as to whether prototypical 
compliance programs do more than provide lip service to governance norms. 
Interestingly enough, this is not what the Framework for 
Cooperation does.  It avoids overspecification (historically, a regulator’s tic) 
in favor of no specification (that is, the largely unfettered discretion of the 
criminal prosecutor).  The Framework asks only what compliance measures 
were in place at the firm, and why they failed.  But recall the impossible 
information volume that Enforcement must handle, the inscrutability (to 
Enforcement) of “effective compliance,” and the Framework’s emphasis on 
proactive firm cooperation.  In real life, the Framework’s credit-for-
compliance provision only opens the door for the firm to convince staffers 
that its compliance structures were meaningful, and that the reasons for 
failure were specific and unlikely to be repeated.  The typical medium for 
making this kind of pitch is the Wells Submission, a carefully crafted 
written brief the firm submits in support of its position as Enforcement’s 
initial investigation draws to a close.112  A firm will virtually never say that 
deep cultural problems caused its law violations, and that those conditions 
persist.  Enforcement will rarely have the informational arsenal to counter 
that claim in specific terms.   
                                                 
110This says nothing of more unorthodox approaches to compliance, the merits of which 
cannot even be considered under a checklist-style understanding of compliance.  For 
example, it may be that not all legitimate compliance mechanisms will be based on increasing 
scrutiny.  Some work suggests that over-monitoring can decrease employees’ independent 
motivation to comply with law.  See Robert Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor 
Structure of Organizational Dishonesty, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO 
BUSINESS ETHICS 44 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
111WILSON, supra note 83, at 161-62.  The problem is most severe in the most dysfunctional 
firms, where the absence of easy-to-read signals from inside – e.g., calls to the whistleblower 
hotline – may mask a more pervasive problem. 
112Procedures Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement Proceedings and Termination 
of Staff Investigations, Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Sept. 22, 1972).  See 17 C.F.R. § 
202.5(c) (2005) (providing that persons who become involved in preliminary or formal 
investigations may, on their own initiative, submit a written statement to the Commission 
setting forth their interests and position in regard to the subject matter of the investigation).  
See also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 60290 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 
2004) (providing a brief history of the Wells submission process); Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, 
“Wells Submissions” to the SEC as Offers of Settlement under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 
and their Protection from Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1912, 1912-26 (2002) 
(describing generally Wells Submissions). 
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The absence of meaningful evaluation standards, combined with the 
desire to avoid liability, can also create a moral hazard for firms.  The notion 
that “there simply does not exist an accepted metric used to assess program 
design, operation, and outcome” underlies William Laufer’s pessimistic 
view of corporate compliance programs as risk-shifting devices.113  In his 
view, firms purchase compliance programs modeled on the Organizational 
Settlement Guidelines and their progeny, regardless of their efficacy, 
because those programs are designed to result in grants of corporate amnesty 
or immunity should wrongdoing be uncovered.  Institutional inertia means 
that most compliance and ethics programs do not result in significant 
change.114  Yet, by pointing to a costly and elaborate compliance structure, a 
firm can plausibly shield itself from vicarious liability for an employee’s 
alleged wrongdoing.   
Thus, according to Laufer, many large firms come to think of 
compliance and even corporate ethics as matters of risk management – what 
Citigroup CEO Charles Price calls “cynical happy-talk.”115  Compliance 
serves an insurance function against zealous prosecutorial action, and firms 
purchase only the amount of compliance required to shift liability away 
from the firm.116  It would not be in their interest to purchase too-effective 
compliance structures that uncovered wrongdoing that otherwise would 
have lain undiscovered, so firms may be tempted to follow compliance 
requirements in a minimal, even cynical, way.117  Because the Framework 
does not explicitly require that compliance programs continually improve, 
they become a ceiling instead of a floor.  Ironically, then, Laufer suggests 
                                                 
113See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 
52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1390 (1999) (arguing that given equivocal evidence of compliance 
effectiveness, the rise of the “good corporate citizenship” movement risks undermining the 
objectives and spirit of the corporate criminal law); see also Marie McKendall et al., Ethical 
Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate 
Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 379 (2002) (alluding to studies which indicate 
that ethical compliance programs do not lessen legal violations). 
114See id. at 1407-11 (citing commentators who note that ethics codes are poorly integrated 
into firm culture). 
115See Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Works on Its Reputation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at 
C3.  To be clear, Mr. Price was speaking of the need to avoid cynical happy-talk in designing 
compliance programs. 
116See Laufer, supra note 113, at 1382-1402 (explaining that prescriptive steps for due 
diligence afford firms protections from criminal investigations, indictments, conviction, and 
fines); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 
93 YALE L. J. 857, 859-62 (1984) (asserting that employee indemnification agreements tend 
to limit the degree to which blame-shifting to employees actually results in pecuniary savings 
for the firm); cf. Stone, supra note 23, at 47-56 (arguing at 56 that employee indemnification 
can be a “ruse a firm can devise to take care of its good soldiers”).  The SEC takes the 
position that indemnification for securities law violations is void as a matter of public policy; 
see Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3) (2005). 
117See Laufer, supra note 113; Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 833 (1994). 
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that the “good corporate citizenship” movement may actually generate 
moral hazards that undermine corporate governance objectives.118 
Rewards for having a compliance program in place only go to the 
existence of that program—not to the existence of a thoughtful presence 
behind them that can work to make them effective and self-reflexive.  
Strategies for avoiding regulatory sanctions are not necessarily coterminous 
with strategies for identifying root causes and problems, and working to fix 
them.  The problem, then, is not only overdefinition or underdefinition of 
the term “compliance.” but rather the institutional situation that forces 
Enforcement to extend leniency to firms in exchange for having an effective 
compliance program, when Enforcement can have no way of knowing what 
an effective compliance program entails or whether it exists at the firm in 
question.  What is needed instead is a problem solving approach that focuses 
on endogenous learning and norm generation. 
The Problem with Credit-for-Cooperation   
Self-policing and self-regulating are integral components of the 
modern administrative regime.  The complexity of modern business means 
that neither regulators nor Enforcement staff could do their job without 
leveraging the firm in its own regulation.  Presumably this makes 
Enforcement staff feel justified in meting out increasingly severe 
punishments to firms that do not cooperate with their investigators.119  
                                                 
118See Laufer, supra note 113, at 1405-19.  Laufer does not see a way out of the moral hazard 
and the problem of “cosmetic compliance” until prosecutors/enforcers and firms share a 
consistent understanding of what an “effective” compliance system entails, and a workable 
metric for evaluating compliance systems.  Supra at 1419-20.  See also Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 80 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 487, 491-92, 510-16 (2003) (arguing that placing excessive importance on compliance 
structures raises dangers of underenforcement and social waste). 
119Lucent Corporation was fined $25 million recently for failing to cooperate in an 
investigation.  According to Associate Director of Enforcement Paul Berger, the case “sends 
a message about cooperation during an investigation.”  Press Release, SEC, Lucent Settles 
SEC Enforcement Action Charging the Company with $1.1 Billion Accounting Fraud (May 
17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-67.htm.  Other firms that have 
been fined for failing to cooperate include Xerox, Dynegy, Banc of America Securities, and 
AIG.  See Press Release, SEC, Xerox Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging Company 
with Fraud (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-52.txt 
(imposing a then-unpredcedented $10 million penalty reflecting, in part, a sanction for the 
company’s lack of full cooperation in the investigation); In re Dynegy, Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 46537 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17744.htm (imposing a $3 million penalty due to 
the Commission’s dissatisfaction with Dynegy’s lack of full cooperation); In re Banc of 
America Securities LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49386 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49386.htm (imposing a $10 million civil penalty for 
BAS’s alleged failure to meet the Commission’s reasonable document requests, and 
emphasizing the “overriding importance” of broker-dealer compliance with requests of 
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According to Mr. Cutler, “the Commission is placing a greater emphasis 
than ever before on assessing and weighing cooperation when making 
charging and sanctioning decisions.”120 
But there is cooperation, and then there is cooperation.121  In its 
benign presentation, the cooperation condition is an expression of 
regulators’ desire to avoid corrosive adversarialism.  It aspires to a genuine 
partnership between the enforcer and the “good” corporate citizen, which 
after all should want to cooperate to root out wrongdoing.  In this sense, 
firm cooperation after wrongdoing is discovered can be an important 
indicator of a firm’s bona fides.  The cooperation condition seeks to 
eliminate the “hide the ball” culture among both defense counsel and 
regulators, in favor of mutually beneficial disclosure and problem solving.122 
                                                                                                                  
regulatory authorities during investigations); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges American 
International Group and Others in Brightpoint Securities Fraud (Sept. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-111.htm (imposing a $10 million civil penalty relating 
to “AIG’s participation in the Brightpoint fraud, as well as misconduct by AIG during the 
Commission’s investigation”).  
120Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks Before the District of Columbia Bar Association (Feb. 11, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch021104smc.htm.  Cases in which 
corporate cooperation has explicitly led to reduced sanctions include SEC v. Giesecke, 
Litigation Release No. 17745 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17745.htm (declining to bring any enforcement 
action against Homestore, Inc. because of its “swift, extensive and extraordinary cooperation 
in the Commission’s investigation”); In re Rite-Aid Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46099 
(June 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46099.htm (considering 
the value of Rite Aid’s cooperation in determining the appropriate resolution of this matter); 
Alliance Capital Management, supra note 32; In re Gateway, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 
8838 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8338.htm (stating 
that the Commission has considered Gateway’s cooperative undertakings in deciding to 
accept Gateway’s offer). 
121With apologies to Lord Denning: Crabb v. Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 187 
(U.K.) (“there are estoppel and estoppel”). 
122Cooperation between investigator and subject was not the norm, at least in the criminal 
context, before the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were implemented.  As one 
observer noted in 1985, because white collar criminal investigations often went on for 
substantial periods of time, “information control” – i.e., “keeping documents away from and 
preventing clients and witnesses from talking to government investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges” – was central to at least some counsels’ defense strategy.  See KENNETH MANN, 
DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK, 6-8 (1985).  In 
case one is left with the impression that only defendants were perceived to be “hiding the 
ball,” see, e.g., U.S. v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 471 n.4 (E.D.Cal. 1994); United 
States v. Houlihan, 937 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating that criminal discovery is 
not, nor should it be, the game of hide the ball, as the stakes are too high for both sides).  The 
dates of these cases demonstrate, of course, that “hide the ball” behavior did not end with the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines’ promulgation in 1991. 
Page 37 of 72 
    
Credit-for-cooperation schemes of any sort can be problematic,123  
but my concern is primarily the “flipping” kind of cooperation.  Seen 
through a darker lens, the cooperation condition can imply a quiet 
agreement between a firm and its regulator, in which the firm acquires 
leniency in exchange for assisting Enforcement staff to make a case against 
another Enforcement target.124  Especially given the obstacles they face in 
making retrospective sense of the document universe, and the theoretical 
and practical problems involved in attaching blame to a complex corporate 
form,125 enforcers might be expected to welcome cooperation where it 
furthers the enforcement action in question.  This is,especially true if the 
action includes sanctions against a high-profile individual.  Ever-increasing 
standards of cooperation can become a substitute for good corporate 
citizenship. 
The information that emerges from such a process may be suspect, 
like all information coming from a self-interested informant.126  Cooperation 
is an effective enforcement tool because it cuts through volumes of 
information through which Enforcement staff themselves do not have the 
resources to wade.  The problem is that cooperation cuts through volumes of 
documents in unverifiable ways.  Moreover, the “cut” is generally 
performed by a party that has a stake in the investigation’s outcome, and 
that normally has greater financial, human, and information-management 
resources than any other party.  Recall the value-added cooperation the SEC 
demands under the Framework for Cooperation.  Because “cooperation” 
means not only producing documents and making witnesses available but 
also assisting the SEC’s understanding of the case, the firm has the ability to 
                                                 
123Even in its benign form, the cooperation requirement can cause problems for defense 
counsel.  Cooperating with the SEC does not guarantee leniency with other regulators or 
prosecutors.  Privilege waivers in exchange for credit-for-cooperation are rightly 
controversial; see, e.g., Am. Coll. Of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 
307 (2003) (asserting that by waiving attorney-client privileges, the government demands 
change the very nature of the adversarial process of the criminal justice system).  Cooperation 
can also be detrimental to a firm where information and even counsel work product produced 
to a regulator becomes discoverable in parallel civil litigation proceedings. 
124See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 643 (2002); Phyllis Diamond, Special Report: SEC Demand for 
‘Cooperation’ Seen Raising Due Process Concerns, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1070 
(June 14, 2004). 
125See supra note 81. 
126Criminal prosecutors have known this for a long time.  See, e.g., Graham Hughes, 
Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1992); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and 
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999) (arguing that there are no studies that 
examine the manner in which cooperators work with prosecutors and the extent to which 
prosecutors can determine whether cooperators are truthful). 
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shape and frame the evidence, potentially even before the SEC has 
developed its own impressions of it.127   
In this distorted environment, the parties’ incentives may be aligned, 
and this compounds the problem.  Where both Enforcement and the firm 
have a common interest in seeing problems resolved quickly, and both 
understand that allocating blame is a central part of the exercise, expeditious 
and mutually satisfactory resolution may become a higher priority than deep 
corporate governance reform or due process for individuals.  The firm has 
an incentive to emphasize those facts that suggest that a rogue employee—
not senior management and not a general culture of disregard for law—is 
the cause of its woes.128  The incentive toward what William Laufer calls 
“reverse whistleblowing” would theoretically be strongest in those 
companies with the most to hide.129  Presumably, an entrenched “insiders’ 
culture” is also more likely to scapegoat where necessary to protect itself.  
Frontline Enforcement staff, for their part, are under a great deal of pressure 
(from the public, the media, other regulators, and likely superiors) to 
achieve results and exhibit toughness toward corporate wrongdoing.130  High 
profile enforcement actions can significantly enhance Enforcement prestige.  
The goal of an enforcement action must always include allocating 
responsibility (i.e., blame), and resolving the case.    Behavioral psychology 
tells us that the risk of bias will exist even where both Enforcement staff and 
defense counsel are acting with integrity and goodwill.131  Whether or not 
individual Enforcement staff and counsel are fair and capable—as no doubt 
they are—as a structural matter, no enforcement system should rest so 
heavily on embedded individuals’ perfection of judgment.   
Moreover, to the extent that Enforcement conduct is not transparent, 
credible, and characterized by due process, it undermines efforts to promote 
good governance within regulated companies.  SEC Administrative Releases 
shed little light on the nuts and bolts of how firm cooperation contributed to 
                                                 
127In addition to producing reports and bringing potential violations to Enforcement’s 
attention, other forms of cooperation might include developing chronologies or producing 
selective bundles of “hot” documents. 
128A disagreement between employee and firm along these lines is recorded in Randall Smith 
& Susan Pulliam, IPO ‘Rogue’ Battles to Clear His Name, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at 
C1. 
129See Laufer, supra note 124, at 648-650, 659-660.  
130The powerful effect of prestige-related incentives on prosecutors to bring and resolve cases 
is one of the points made by James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2030, 2078-2101 (2000).  According to Liebman, the pressure on law enforcement 
and prosecutors to “solve the crime and punish the perpetrator, harshly,” combined with the 
fact that capital murder cases can often be hard to solve because of the absence of certain 
kinds of key evidence, can lead to cutting corners in investigations. 
131See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (on the “hindsight bias”); Zivi Kunda, The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990) (on “motivated inference”). 
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any particular enforcement outcome.  Settlement releases are pre-negotiated 
between firm and Enforcement, and generally provide only boilerplate 
language to the effect that the Staff had considered the firm’s cooperation in 
its settlement decision.132  Worse yet, Enforcement staff themselves may not 
be in a position to verify that the firm’s cooperation provided anything more 
than potentially shotgun information implicating individuals.   
The cooperation condition skews the enforcement pyramid in the 
service of conduct that bears only an oblique relationship to compliance 
with law.  Even the perception that firms can reduce their liability and avoid 
meaningful reform efforts by making “backroom” deals is costly.  An 
employee’s sense that she could be “scapegoated” can result in self-
protective and often counterproductive behavior.  When a firm blows the 
whistle on one or more individuals, it also obscures the ways in which 
corporate wrongdoing is so often an organizational problem.133  Perhaps 
more importantly, by offering an easier route to leniency, the cooperation 
option can help firms avoid necessary but difficult, resource-intensive, 
ongoing self-analysis (carried out in the shadow of a demonstrated 
compliance failure).  Searching self-reflection is a challenging project that 
requires discipline and stamina.  Firms might be entitled not to undertake 
such a project – in fact their shareholders might expect them not to – where 
an officially endorsed shortcut is available. 
3.  Reform Undertakings as Enforcement Innovation  
Whether or not by conscious design, recent SEC actions are 
showing the first indications of a new, or newly rediscovered,134 approach to 
                                                 
132See, e.g., In re Corrpro Companies, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18547 (Jan. 16, 2004), 
(where injunction issued, but “the Commission considered that Corrpro undertook remedial 
actions and substantial cooperation with Commission staff”), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18547.htm; In re Performance Food Group 
Company, Exchange Act Release No. 49243 (Feb. 13, 2004) (“the Commission considered 
remedial acts promptly undertaken by PFG and cooperation afforded the Commission staff”), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49243.htm; In re Citigroup, Inc., 
Exchange Act Release No. 48230 (July 28, 2003) (it was “considered that Citigroup had 
cooperated with the Commission's investigation in a timely and comprehensive manner, 
including production of witnesses and documents without delay, responsiveness to other 
requests for information, and timely efforts to resolve this matter.”), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.htm. 
133See Laufer, supra note 124, at 653, 657.  There is some evidence to indicate that the most 
harmful white collar crimes are those which are most “organizationally complex.”  See, e.g., 
DAVID WEISBRUD, STANTON WHEELER ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE-
COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 183-85 (1991). 
134The SEC has employed “creative” relief, including requiring firms to make an undertaking 
to retain an independent consultant or committee to conduct some kind of review, at least 
since the 1970s.  Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 
47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1128-31 (1992); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET, 463-64, 541, 616-19 (3rd ed. 2003); STONE,  supra note 56, at 185-86.  According to 
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enforcement settlements.  This approach responds to worries about facial 
compliance, scapegoating, institutional capacity, and the limitations of 
deterrence in effecting thoroughgoing reform to corporate governance.  This 
is the “Reform Undertaking” previously referred to in this paper. 
Reform Undertakings may be court-ordered,135 administratively 
ordered,136 or incorporated into settlement agreements between Enforcement 
                                                                                                                  
Mr. Cutler, they were used especially pre-1984, when the SEC’s statutory power to impose 
substantial civil penalties was more limited.  Cutler, supra note 2.  Other precedents for 
interventionist enforcement remedies, outside the public law litigation context, include New 
York City’s response to organized crime in the late 1980s.  See RONALD GOLDSTOCK ET AL., 
CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: FINAL 
REPORT TO GOVERNOR MARIO M. CUOMO FROM THE NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME 
TASK FORCE , 157-74 (1990). 
135In the WorldCom case, for example, the SEC filed suit in June 2002, following the 
company’s announcement that its earnings had been massively misstated.  SEC Charges 
WorldCom with $3.8 Billion Fraud, Litigation Release No. 17588 (June 27, 2002), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17588.htm.  Following a court-ordered expert’s 
recommendations, the Commission sought and was granted injunctive relief under Exchange 
Act sections 21(d) and 27, requiring WorldCom to undertake extensive reviews of its 
corporate governance and internal controls, as well as establish a training and education 
program for its officers and employees to minimize the possibility of future violations of the 
federal securities laws.  The Commission took the innovative step of requesting of sitting 
Judge Jed S. Rakoff that a “Corporate Monitor” (in my terms, a Third Party) be appointed by 
the Court, initially only to oversee management’s conduct and ensure that no inappropriate 
conduct occurred.  As part of a subsequent settlement, the SEC sought, in addition to a 
monetary penalty, to have the Corporate Monitor, former SEC head Richard C. Breeden, 
conduct a governance overhaul as part of an agreed-upon Permanent Injunction.  SEC v. 
WorldCom, Inc., Litigation Release No. 17866 (Nov. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17866.htm.  According to Mr. Breeden’s Report, 
the Permanent Injunction provides that “[t]he Corporate Monitor … shall perform a review of 
the adequacy and effectiveness of WorldCom’s corporate governance systems, policies, 
plans, and practices.  This review will include but is not limited to inquiries into (1) whether 
WorldCom is complying with recognized standards of “best practices” with respect to 
corporate governance; (2) whether WorldCom has sufficient policies and safeguards in place 
(a) to ensure that WorldCom’s Board of Directors and all committees of WorldCom’s Board 
of Directors … have appropriate powers, structure, composition, and resources, and (b) to 
prevent self-dealing by management; (3) whether WorldCom has an adequate and appropriate 
code of ethics and business conduct, and related compliance mechanisms; and (4) whether 
WorldCom has appropriate safeguards in place to prevent further violation of the federal 
securities laws.”  Breeden, supra note 20, at 9 n.4. 
136See, e.g., Ernst & Young, supra note 15.  Chief Administrative Law Judge Murray 
concluded, inter alia, that Ernst & Young’s stated reliance on a “culture of consulting” to 
avoid violating auditor independence rules was a “sham,” and that its business relationships 
with PeopleSoft LLP were “outrageous,” “improper,” and “blatant” in their violation of those 
rules.  She noted that the Commission had tried on two previous occasions to bring Ernst & 
Young into compliance through litigation, and held that absent an explicit directive to cease 
and desist, the firm would likely commit future violations.  Along with other penalties, Judge 
Murray ordered: 
Ernst & Young LLP shall retain an independent consultant acceptable to the 
Commission, to work with Ernst & Young LLP to assure the Commission that Ernst 
& Young LLP's leadership is committed to, and has implemented policies and 
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and a firm.  When part of a settlement agreement, the Reform Undertaking 
tends to be accompanied by a cease-and-desist order137 and by additional 
relief against either the firm or individuals including disgorgement or 
restitution, director and officer bars, the requirement that the firm develop or 
enhance existing compliance processes, and civil penalties.  The Reform 
Undertaking appears as a settlement term to the general effect that the firm 
shall retain, at its own expense, an independent third party consultant (the 
“Third Party”).  The Third Party’s role is to intervene in the firm, identify 
compliance failures and reasons for the alleged law violation, and report 
back to the SEC.  While there is substantial variation in Undertakings’ 
specific terms, and especially in the language describing the scope and depth 
of the Third Party’s investigation, the Undertakings share certain core 
features.  They include: (1) a focus on the firm, not individuals, with 
particular view to its compliance and corporate governance policies, 
practices, and procedures; (2) prospective, standards-based language, giving 
the Third Parties substantial discretion to interpret what constitutes a 
“reasonable” or “appropriate” remedial recommendation; (3) a 
presumptively final settlement with Enforcement, combined with provision 
for a relatively extended time period during which the Third Party conducts 
its review, sometimes further reinforced by subsequent periodic review; (4) 
provision for a written Third Party report; and (5) provisions to safeguard 
the Third Party’s independence. 
In every case I am aware of in which a Reform Undertaking has 
been put into action, it has fallen short of being a textbook New Governance 
remedy in both drafting and execution.  Part Four, below, sets out a model 
                                                                                                                  
procedures that reasonably can be expected to remedy the violations found in this 
Initial Decision and result in compliance with the Commission's rules on auditor 
independence related to business relationships with clients and with GAAS. Ernst & 
Young LLP shall cooperate with the independent consultant in all respects, including 
staff support, and shall compensate the independent consultant, and staff, if one is 
necessary, at reasonable and customary rates. Once retained, Ernst & Young LLP 
shall not terminate the relationship with the independent consultant without 
Commission approval. The independent consultant shall report to the Commission in 
writing six months from the date work has begun as to the findings of its review and 
Ernst & Young LLP's efforts at correcting the violations. 
137The Commission has the statutory authority to supplement a cease-and-desist order with a 
requirement that its subject: 
comply, or to take steps to effect compliance, with such provision, rule, or regulation, 
upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify 
in such order. Any such order may, as the Commission deems appropriate, require 
future compliance or steps to effect future compliance, either permanently or for such 
period of time as the Commission may specify, with such provision, rule, or 
regulation with respect to any security, any issuer, or any other person.   
Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(2000); Securities Exchange Act § 21C, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(f) (2000);  
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 203(k), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(k) (2000).   
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of a more complete “True Reform Undertaking,” as a remedial alternative 
that incorporates New Governance learning into the distinct Enforcement 
environment.  However, even in its present form the Reform Undertaking 
represents a profound shift in enforcement philosophy.  The first step, I 
suspect, must have been Enforcement staff’s willingness to address their 
own institutional limitations in an innovative way.  Unlike the credit-for-
compliance and credit-for-cooperation models, the Reform Undertaking 
model accepts that Enforcement itself is ill-suited to promote institutional 
reform, because it has neither the resources nor the appropriate culture.  At 
the same time, in its best form the Reform Undertaking model provides a 
mechanism for identifying concrete steps the firm must take to reform its 
corporate governance as a condition of getting “out from under” 
Enforcement scrutiny.  In other words, the Reform Undertaking parses the 
liability and remedial phases in dealing with a regulated firm.  In its ideal 
form it uses the enforcement “stick” to spur, but not to define or manage, 
more profound institutional reform.  It employs the concept of best 
practices, which is a Trojan horse for more thoroughgoing reform.  Having 
committed to that standard, the firm is charged with ratcheting up its 
governance practices above mere industry standards, to match the best 
practices available on an ongoing basis.  This process, in turns, ratchets up 
general corporate governance standards.138 
During his tenure as Northeast Region Associate Director, Barry 
Rashkover observed that the SEC now frequently defers to independent 
consultants to tailor specific reforms in the context of court-ordered 
undertakings.139  Reform Undertakings also appear in settlement documents, 
sometimes jointly reached with other government bodies, such as the United 
States Attorney’s Office.140  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the scope of an 
Undertaking reached through settlement (rather than adjudication) seems to 
be more broadly worded, and undertakings are becoming more detailed and 
sophisticated over time.  Undertakings appear in settlements with private 
                                                 
138As one set of commentators has stated, “[t]he relationship between law and organizations 
is a highly reciprocal one: Each [sic] realm interpenetrates, transforms, and reconstitutes the 
other, with neither being fully exogenous nor causally prior.”  Mark Suchman & Lauren 
Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society 
Tradition, 21 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 903, 905 (1996). 
139See Rashkover, supra note 3, at 544. 
140These footnotes are not a comprehensive catalog of recent Reform Undertakings.  But see, 
e.g., SEC v. Computer Associates International, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18891 (Sept. 22, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18891.htm.  Computer 
Associates agreed, inter alia, to be subject to “[f]orward looking remedial relief, including, 
for at least 18 months, that Computer Associates will be subject to the review of an 
Independent Examiner, reporting to the SEC, the Justice Department and Computer 
Associates’ Board of Directors.”  While New York Attorney General Spitzer has been a large 
player in recent securities law enforcement actions, to my knowledge his office has not 
played a role in fashioning the Reform Undertakings I describe here. 
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companies,141 investment advisors,142 specialist firms,143 and self-regulatory 
organizations144 (whose own governance practices have been under scrutiny 
lately).145 
                                                 
141See, e.g., In re GE InVision, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51199 (Feb. 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51199.htm; In re Monsanto Company, 
Exchange Act Release No. 50978 (Jan. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50978.htm; Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note 35.  
The InVision and Monsanto releases relate to alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m et seq. (2004).  The only information available online with 
respect to the scope of the Bristol-Myers Reform Undertaking is that the Third Party is “to 
review Bristol-Myers’ accounting practices and internal control systems and periodically 
assess the status of remedial actions undertaken or planned by the Company in those and 
other areas, such as financial reporting.”   
142See, e.g., Nevis Capital Management, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2214 (Feb 9, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2214.htm; In re H.D. Vest 
Investment Securities Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8383 (Feb 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8383.htm; In re Massachusetts Financial Services, 
supra note 32; In re Alliance Capital Management, supra note 32; In re Putnam Investment 
Management, LLC, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2192 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2192.htm.  Banc of America Capital Management 
voluntarily undertook to retain an independent compliance consultant in a recent settlement: 
In re Banc of America Capital Management LLC, Securities Act Release No. 8538 (Feb. 9, 
2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8538.htm.  As part of each of 
these settlements, the SEC obtained (in addition to a cease-and-desist order, monetary fines 
and, in some cases, other consideration) firm undertakings to appoint a Third Party, at the 
firm’s expense, to conduct an in-depth review of the firm’s policies, practices, and procedures 
related to the firm’s area of alleged wrongdoing, for purposes of determining compliance 
with the federal securities laws and recommending policies and practices designed to ensure 
such compliance.  The firms undertook to require the Third Parties to produce a report to the 
firm and the Commission, describing the review performed and providing recommendations; 
and to implement substantially all the Third Parties’ recommendations or reach an alternative 
good faith agreement.  Additional terms seek to ensure the firm’s cooperation and the Third 
Party’s independence, including a stipulation that the firm shall not have the ability to fire the 
Third Party; a prohibition on an attorney-client relationship between firm and Third Party; 
and a prohibition on “repeat business” between Third Party and firm.  The Massachusetts 
Financial Services, Putnam, and Alliance capital settlements also provide for periodic 
compliance review after the Undertaking period, although not subject to Commission 
oversight.  The Banc of America settlement requires the family of companies’ CEOs to 
certify that the firms have adopted and complied in all material respects with their 
undertakings. 
143Pursuant to its powers under Exchange Act sections 15(b)(4) and 21C, the SEC entered 
into similar arrangements with five large specialist firms in regard to allegations of “trading 
ahead” of customer orders.  All five cease-and-desist orders were issued on March 30, 2004: 
In re Bear Wagner Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49498, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49498.htm; In re Fleet Specialists, Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 49499, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49499.htm; In 
re LaBranche & Co. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49500, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49500.htm; In re Spear, Leeds & Kellogg LLC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 49501, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-
49501.htm; In re Van der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49502, 
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The Reform Undertaking should be distinguished from centralized, 
one-off structural reorganization, such as characterized the 2003 Global 
Research Analyst Settlement.146  However, as structural remedies and 
especially in terms of the loss of control the firm experiences, they are 
similar to what one might see in bankruptcy reorganization.147  We should 
expect them to be unpopular with firms, not only for their indeterminacy and 
cost but because to some degree, the Reform Undertaking moves the loss of 
                                                                                                                  
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49502.pdf. The specialist settlements are 
similar to the Investment Company Act settlements above. 
144The SEC is empowered to impose sanctions and cease-and-desist orders on self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) under Exchange Act sections 19(h) and 21C respectively.   
Significantly, in the first regulatory action following her appointment as Director of SEC 
Enforcement, Linda Chatman Thomsen announced an especially comprehensive Reform 
Undertaking scheme in connection with a settlement agreement with the National Stock 
Exchange and its President and CEO:  In re National Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release 
No. 51714 (May 19, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51714.pdf.  The 
independent Third Party monitor in that case is responsible for conducting a “comprehensive 
review” of the NSX’s policies and procedures relating to, inter alia, rulemaking, surveillance, 
member firm compliance examination, virtually the full range of enforcement functions, and 
document retention.  The Chicago Stock Exchange also recently agreed to a cease-and-desist 
order in settlement of an administrative action relating to its failure to supervise and correct 
trading rules violations by specialists and co-specialists on its trading floor.  See In re 
Chicago Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 48566 (Sept. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48566.htm.  Its Undertaking terms are substantially 
similar to those contained in the Investment Company Act and specialist firm settlements 
above, but additionally stipulate that either the Board of Governors or the Regulatory 
Oversight Committee must certify that it has read the Third Party’s report, made “reasonable 
inquiry about the issues raised,” and observed the Exchange’s Undertakings.  Further, the 
CEO must certify that “he or she reasonably believes that CHX's trading floor surveillance 
and enforcement programs are adequate to meet CHX's obligations under Section 19(g) of the 
Exchange Act.” 
145Self-Regulatory Organizations – Various Amendments; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 
71,126 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 240, 242, and 249), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-50699.pdf; Regulation NMS; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 77424 (Dec. 27, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, 
and 270), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-50870fr.pdf.  
146While the Global Research Analyst Settlements call for the settling firms to retain 
independent monitors at their own expense, those monitors’ responsibilities are limited to 
“conduct[ing] a review to provide reasonable assurance that the firm is complying with the 
[agreed to] structural reforms.”  SEC Fact Sheet on Global Research Analyst Settlements, at 
http://sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm.  See also, In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release 
No. 51574 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51574.pdf (in which 
KPMG undertook to retain a consultant for the “limited purpose” of certifying to the SEC 
that a series of agreed-upon corporate governance undertakings “continue to be in effect, are 
being complied with and appear to be effective in achieving their overall goals” after two 
years’ time.)    
147See Bankruptcy Code § 1106(a)(3), (4), 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3), (4).  For an intriguing 
analysis of the role of the Chief Restructuring Officer, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, When Good Managers Go Bad: Controlling the Agents of Enterprise 
(unpublished manuscript presented at Columbia Law School on March 7, 2005, on file with 
Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies). 
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control further up in a dismal chronology of events.148  On the other hand, 
behavioral psychology has taught us that people tend to overly discount the 
future in their calculations.149  Thus, when one recalls that a large number of 
the firms publicly accused of massive frauds over the last few years have 
ended up in bankruptcy proceedings, the Reform Undertaking looks like a 
sensible intervention before the costs to all involved get even higher. 
Comparative Advantages 
Relative to the mechanisms discussed above, the Reform 
Undertaking does a better job of leveraging Enforcement’s strengths and 
compensating for its limitations. 
To begin with, the Reform Undertaking handles the resource 
problem facing Enforcement.  It is the thoughtful result of squarely facing 
the misfit between Enforcement’s processes and its aspirations of spurring 
institutional reform.  As discussed above, Enforcement will never be as well 
equipped to analyze detailed information on compliance structures as the 
settling firm itself would be.  The Reform Undertaking does not require 
Enforcement staff to act as long term regulators or compliance specialists.  It 
allows Enforcement teams to remain temporary, flexible, and non-
bureaucratic.  It matches tools to problems, rather than trying to shoehorn 
problems into existing tools.150 
Secondly, as a function of distinguishing the liability phase from the 
remedial phase,151 the Reform Undertaking substantially neutralizes the 
counterproductive elements of the adversarial stance.  There will be little 
trust between Enforcement and firms that are being investigated.  Firms 
often behave in a strategic end-game manner in that environment.  It is a 
high stakes situation that promotes evasive, not collaborative, action.  The 
Reform Undertaking relieves some of the immediate pressure by taking the 
full articulation of a remedy out of the hands of Enforcement staff, and 
putting it in the hands of an independent Third Party.  Removing the 
Enforcement stick from direct view can create a space where the firm is free, 
at least in relative terms, to think about compliance creatively and 
autonomously, based on voluntary problem solving instead of rule-based 
                                                 
148In Ernst & Young, supra note 15, the defendant firm argued that the requirement that it 
retain an independent third party consultant was an “outrageous” and punitive measure. 
149BAZERMAN & WATKINS, supra note 13, at 84-87. 
150This is not to say that there will not still be work for Enforcement to do in, e.g., choosing 
along which criteria firms should be subject to Reform Undertakings.  See SPARROW, supra 
note 75, at 155-70.  Nevertheless, these are not the same issues that arise from being 
confronted with impossible information volumes in an Enforcement division entirely 
structurally unsuited to handling it. 
151Sabel & Simon, supra  note 62, at 1051-57. 
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enforcement.152  Because it comes from the firm itself (in conjunction with 
Third Party action) and is not imposed from above, this method has a better 
chance of producing a sustainable and meaningful response.  Relatedly, the 
Reform Undertaking reduces the pathologies associated with the short term 
orientation.  A resolution that is substantially satisfactory to the market is 
achieved when settlement occurs, relieving pressure on Enforcement to 
resolve the matter through whatever means necessary, but the parties have a 
longer remedial timeframe within which to work out the details based on 
better information and contextual analysis.153   
The Reform Undertaking avoids the over- and underdefinition 
problems that credit-for-compliance regimes may suffer from, while still 
achieving an adequate level of closure.  The Reform Undertaking structure 
permits Enforcement staff to jettison rigid compliance checklists in favor of 
broad outcome measures.  At the same time, they are not left (as they are 
now) to exercise their discretion in extending credit-for-compliance, based 
on an inevitably incomplete analysis of what an “adequate” program would 
entail.  Enforcers’ worries about the manageability or enforceability of 
vague rules are deflated, since standards-based approaches in the remedial 
enforcement context do not face the problems of overbreadth they do in the 
predictive context.  What remains are general standards, the specific 
implementation of which is worked out through the remedial process.  One 
can track the shift in the language of the Reform Undertaking terms, which 
reintroduce open, discretion-granting words.  There is talk of “policies and 
procedures that reasonably can be expected to remedy violations,” or the 
need to consider “broader” or “structural issues” as well as immediate 
ones.154  The Reform Undertaking’s investigatory nature addresses the 
firm’s incentive to treat compliance checklist as insurance, or to avoid 
implementing too-effective mechanisms that might uncover wrongdoing. 
Properly implemented, the Reform Undertaking settlement also has 
a more explicit and transparent (and therefore reinforcing) relationship to 
the enforcement pyramid than do credit-for-cooperation or credit-for-
compliance settlements.  Firms with deep compliance problems are directed 
to respond to those problems, rather than extricating themselves from the 
Enforcement ambit through inscrutable means.  Especially the True Reform 
                                                 
152Making the same point in a different context, see Sturm, supra note 63; Susan P. Sturm, 
New Governance and the Architecture of Learning, Mobilization, and Accountability: 
Lessons from Gender Equity Regimes, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra 
note 81 (manuscript at 7-8, on file with author). 
153Reform Undertaking terms generally require third parties to produce a first report within 
60 days of being retained, but their involvement with the firm tends to be longer: e.g., in 
Monsanto, supra note 141, the Third Party is retained for three years. 
154See Ernst & Young, supra note 15; and Chicago Stock Exchange, supra note 144 
(discussing the existence of policies and procedures that can reasonably remedy violations). 
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Undertaking described in greater detail below does not raise the sorts of 
obvious due process concerns that credit-for-cooperation raises.  It avoids 
both agency capture and backroom horse-trading, as Ayres and Braithwaite 
suggest the injection of a third party is likely to do.155  This is important at 
the broader level as well.  If other firms understand that they cannot “buy” 
their way out of Enforcement action through cooperation, and that 
Enforcement actions are credible, proportional, and factually justified, this 
shortcut to resolution-without-reform will be closed off.  By removing from 
Enforcement’s hands the ability to reward companies, it neutralizes the fact 
that the firm’s and Enforcement’s short term interests in closure and even 
scapegoating may be aligned.  Transparency produces accountability, and 
transparent Enforcement processes are more likely to create market 
structures more demonstrably worthy of investors’ confidence.   
The Reform Undertaking also maintains the power of the coercive 
“stick,” and stays focused on the worst actors.  The coercive background 
situation remains.  Firms that, according to their Third Parties, do not 
succeed in the Reform Undertaking environment remain answerable to the 
SEC.156  Intuition supports regulatory responses that target the worst 
offenders.157  The entire enforcement pyramid presupposes that the worst 
offenders are singled out for sanctioning, and that the example of worst 
                                                 
155On “regulatory tripartism,” see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 56-58. 
156Under the language of all the settlements above, firms are required to accept the Third 
Parties’ recommendations if they cannot reach a good faith agreement about an alternative 
solution.  Faced with an unsatisfactory result, the SEC could choose to extend the term of the 
Reform Undertaking or to impose additional sanctions, up to and including license 
revocation. 
157An important predecessor—successful on its merits, though short-lived for separate legal 
reasons—was OSHA’s “Cooperative Compliance Program,” (CCP) created in 1997 and 
directed specifically at workplaces with the highest injury rates. The program was modeled 
on the award-winning “Maine 200” program, begun in 1993, which targeted the 200 
companies in that state with the highest workers’ compensation rates (i.e., Maine’s worst 
actors).  Companies opting into the program would establish a health and safety program in 
cooperation with OSHA, and in exchange would be dropped from OSHA’s regular inspection 
program. High-injury workplaces not opting into the program would be the subject of 
heightened inspections.  In Maine, 65% of participating employers saw reductions in overall 
injury and illness rates, and over the first two years participating employers experienced a 
47.3% decrease in compensable claims for worker’s compensation (as compared to 27% for 
all Maine employers).  U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Mini Case Study: “Maine Top 
200” —OSHA Shifts its Focus From Regulations To Outcomes (2000), at 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/leveraging/03c.html.  The CPP’s underlying directive was vacated 
by the District of Columbia Circuit on the basis that OSHA’s issuance of its directive failed 
to comply with the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.  
Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Department of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (C.A.D.C. 1999).  
Since then, OSHA has reverted to rewarding good firms rather than educating/reforming the 
worst performers: information on its Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) is available at 
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html.  As a case-specific remedial enforcement 
mechanism, the Reform Undertaking is not vulnerable to the same charge. 
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firms reinforces the system’s credibility down the line.  The marginal effect 
of change is also greater when dealing with the worst actors, which cause 
disproportionate damage.  A focus on the worst actors provides a necessary 
counterweight to regulators’ tendency to focus on the best performers, 
which may be celebrated because they reinforce the wisdom of the agency’s 
policies. 
Further, the Reform Undertaking model is better suited to problems 
of organizational behavior than a model oriented toward individual liability 
would be.  It accepts that there can be systemic institutional problems at a 
firm (something that individual blame models cannot accommodate) but its 
focus is not on the senseless exercise of “punishing” the “bad” firm.  The 
focus is on reform and preventing similar occurrences in the future.  This is 
a situation where forward-looking remedial standards, relying on technical, 
contextual forms of thought rather than blame allocation, are better suited to 
the corporate form, and to the goal pursued.158 
Finally, the Reform Undertaking is, if anything, even more of a 
“wake up call” to firms than normal enforcement is.  SEC Enforcement 
action is, of course, always destabilizing.  It is even more destabilizing when 
the prescribed remedy is to engage in an open-ended process, the goal of 
which it is to reject the status quo ante in favor of as-yet-unspecified results, 
reached through hard-to-control processes, in the presence of an 
independent third party.159 
                                                 
158Simon, supra note 81 at 25-28; Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1054.  Contra, see 
Dallas, supra note 13, at 6-8 (arguing in favor of individual Director and Officer liability for 
failure to address the existence of a “corporate climate that encourages and supports unethical 
and illegal behavior” in a firm). 
159Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1020.  See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-
Forcing Environmental Regulation: Penalty Defaults, Destabilization Rights, and 
Environmental Governance, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 81 
(manuscript at 6-7, 29-32, on file with author).  According to Sabel & Simon, writing in the 
public interest litigation context, the principal effects of destabilization rights are: (1) the Veil 
Effect: parties “cannot count on their prior positions, and it may be hard for them to 
anticipate what their positions will be like in the alternative future regimes under 
consideration”, so the “struggle for selfish advantage is impeded at the outset of remedial 
negotiations”; (2) the Status Quo Effect: “[t]he condemnation of the status quo has a distinct 
cognitive effect: it releases the mental grip of conventional structures on the capacity to 
consider alternatives”; (3) the Deliberation Effect: “justifying one’s position by giving 
reasons and responding to reasoned arguments for competing views can alter a person’s 
understanding of her factual circumstances and her interests, disclosing previously unseen 
opportunities”; (4) the Publicity Effect: contingent on transparency, public scrutiny may 
generate pressure toward responsible behavior; (5) the Stakeholder Effects: the balance of 
power between plaintiff and defendant shifts, and subordinate players get more autonomy; 
internal pressures are generated within the plaintiff class and the defendant institution; new 
stakeholders are motivated or empowered to participate; and,  (6) the Web Effect.  Action 
ramifies to other institutions and practices, and creates a new best practices standard that 
other institutions will have to consider.  Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1073-82. 
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4.  Next Steps and Missing Pieces 
The attributes described above may make one dare to hope that the 
Reform Undertaking will be more effective at spurring institutional reform 
than any other tool in the Enforcement staffer’s kit.  Yet this is not to say 
that a poorly designed Undertaking cannot be gamed or manipulated, or that 
more traditional sanctions are now anachronistic.  On the contrary, one of 
the important points this paper tries to make is that New Governance 
mechanisms may operate most effectively in tandem with other forms of 
compliance-oriented action.  No single remedial approach will be an all-
purpose magic bullet.  Yet, New Governance concepts can make a more-
than-theoretical contribution to the complex and messy world of real-life 
enforcement action, and settlements.   
If it is to be as effective as it can be within its bandwidth, however, 
the Reform Undertaking structure will need to gain more traction with 
respect to four main issues: the firm’s participation in the process; the role 
and accountability of the independent Third Party; the SEC’s ability to 
aggregate data on best practices; and Enforcement’s ability to synchronize 
staff incentives with mechanisms that further meaningful governance 
reform.  The sections that follow describe the attributes of a True Reform 
Undertaking model that incorporates these important elements, and that 
establishes the connection between New Governance theory and real-life 
enforcement.160 
The Intervention: Attributes of the Process 
Unlike the rest of the enforcement process, the Reform Undertaking 
is forward-looking.  One of the main purposes of separating the enforcement 
and remedial phases is to create a relatively brief temporal space within 
which the firm can begin to make sense of its history, define objectives, and 
identify solutions to cultural problems on an ongoing, iterative basis.161  The 
                                                 
160For now this project is limited to investigations of large firms.  The calculation will be 
different when dealing with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), where ownership 
may be less dispersed, and both financial resources (to retain a Third Party) and pre-existing 
institutional capacity (in the form of a well-staffed compliance department) may be more 
limited.  Document volumes in the investigation will be more limited as well.  Small firms 
are too varied in their operations and market niches to generalize about the problem.  The 
SEC is working through similar problems with respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
requirements.  Press Release, SEC, SEC Establishes Advisory Committee to Examine Impact 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Smaller Public Companies (Dec. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-174.htm.  For a thoughtful discussion of New 
Governance environmental regulation and SMEs, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN 
SINCLAIR, LEADERS & LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 13-40 
(2002). 
161Susan Sturm’s work on addressing subtle cultural problems in complex social 
environments, such as workplaces, develops fine-grained insights into the specific challenges 
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point should be to leverage the organization’s own internal vocabulary and 
norms to reorient the firm’s perspectives on governance.  No one said this 
would be easy in practice.  On the contrary, there is no lack of empirical 
evidence suggesting that the reasons that organizations so often behave in 
myopic, rigid ways are deep-seated and not amenable to easy change.162 
The magnitude of the challenge notwithstanding, the Reform 
Undertaking process can take advantage of the substantial learning that has 
occurred in the last few decades, in both private and public sectors, on 
problem solving and participatory corporate governance strategies.163  Some 
elements of the True Reform Undertaking will be unremarkable to those 
familiar with basic governance principles.  Most would agree, for example, 
that the process should be transparent, thorough, and credible.  The Third 
Party should produce a written report for the Commission, based on 
demonstrably reasoned decisionmaking.164  This means that decisions are 
supported by a clear factual record that is the product of a credible 
investigatory process; that discussions and decisions about proposed 
solutions are justified with explicit reasoning, making reference to available 
information and identified governance priorities; and that the investigatory 
process as a whole canvasses the range of perspectives and concerns that are 
likely to affect the practicality and wisdom of a particular solution.165  
Transparent reasoning helps preclude decisionmaking based on pure 
exchange, bias, or scapegoating.  Decisionmaking is disciplined by its 
openness to outsiders’ scrutiny.166 
                                                                                                                  
of such projects and substantially informs the discussion that follows.  See, e.g., Sturm, supra 
note 62; Sturm, supra note 63; Sturm, supra note 152.  
162See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 101 (1997), Sturm, supra note 63, at 468-79. 
163See, e.g., John E. Tropman, MAKING MEETINGS WORK, 2D ED. (2003).  The Harvard Law 
School Project on Negotiation maintains a resource clearinghouse on its website at 
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/main/home/index.php3. 
164All the Reform Undertakings identified supra, in Part 3, require the Third Party to produce 
a written report, and require that it be provided to the Commission. 
165See Sturm, supra note 62, at 1399-1403, 1411, 1434-36.  There is more than one sort of 
reasoned decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Simon, supra note 81, at 19-22 (describing “root cause 
analysis”). 
166Which outsiders should have access to the report is a difficult question.  Limiting 
participation does limit debate and collective learning, and the results of the Undertaking 
would be of quite general interest.  Nevertheless, I say that only the SEC and other Third 
Parties (either directly or through the SEC) should have access to the full reports, because of 
the extraordinary cost and chilling effect of making the specifics discoverable in shareholder 
or other litigation.  Similar concerns have been raised with regard to the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States Sentencing Commission, Report, supra note 95, at 
116-25.  Existing Reform Undertakings make no provision for public dissemination of Third 
Party reports. 
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Just as importantly, the process should be explicitly participatory.  
One might contrast a True Reform Undertaking with the WorldCom model, 
in which a central expert—albeit a very capable one—acted essentially 
alone to produce a series of guidelines to be implemented by the firm.167  
Mr. Breeden’s report is a sophisticated and thoughtful blueprint for revising 
corporate governance structures at WorldCom and beyond, but it was 
written with that high level purpose in mind—not with a view to creating a 
reflexive process within the firm.  If the purpose is to spur thoroughgoing 
institutional reform, then a Third Party’s top-down solutions will not be a 
substitute for the firm’s own involvement.  Imposed solutions are less likely 
to embed themselves, and a failure to come to terms with the organization’s 
collective history can create pathologies around information sharing and 
problem solving.  As Mr. Cutler has said, law-abiding behavior is a product 
not only of structural governance mechanisms, but of all “three Ps”: people, 
process, and place (meaning external variables and causative factors).168 
Broad participation serves several purposes in this context.  Its 
advantages over nonparticipatory processes are considerable.  First, it 
increases the pool of information and contextual knowledge, thereby 
improving the discovery process.  By contrast, the WorldCom model 
reflects a closed system, where a snapshot of information enters after which 
a one-time report from an outsider ensues.169  Second, participation creates 
buy-in.  It gives key players a basis for investing in the process and 
committing to its results.  Third, participatory exercises are exercises in 
governance.  They serve an educative function and actively demonstrate 
new ways of doing business, ideally while learning to speak realistically 
about those areas where firm culture or collective action played a role in 
permitting past wrongdoing.170  By contrast, the expert-centric WorldCom 
                                                 
167Corporate Monitor Breeden’s final report makes 78 specific recommendations, many of 
which are geared toward increasing transparency and shifting the balance of power toward 
shareholders.  See Breeden, supra note 20.  The experimentalist approach to the same 
problem would have involved extensive empirical analysis, extensive consultation with 
WorldCom stakeholders (including service providers and contractors, shareholders, 
employees, and other with a stake in the company’s ongoing success), and the creation of a 
prospective process for fashioning flexible, effective, self-reflexive governance regimes that 
answered to unknown future problems as well as clear past ones. 
168Cutler, Speech, Dec. 6, 2004, supra note 60.  See also Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, 
Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23 (using a 
case study to illustrate that “a fully elaborated explanation of decisionmaking necessarily 
would merge structure, culture, and agency.”) 
169Cognitive psychological insights into experts’ tendencies toward overconfidence and 
“expert myopia” are also relevant here.  See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 105, at 558-61.  
See also Sturm, supra note 62, at 1419-21 (on limitations of “expert remedial formulation 
model”). 
170In a similar vein, see Sturm, supra note 62, at 1390-96.  Sturm also argues that at the 
remedial stage, the conceptual restrictions imposed by legal doctrine during the liability 
phase are more limited.  Thus, what keeps the process rational and legitimate is a different 
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model leaves little room for the firm to do its own learning during the 
Undertaking time frame, and the guidelines are not revisable through 
ongoing learning thereafter.  Finally, in view of the “insiders’ culture” that 
underlies many securities law violations, broad top-to-bottom participation 
makes the process credible to enforcers, and to lower and mid-level firm 
employees. 
The Third Party’s operational methodology should focus on 
problem solving, not just compliance.  Relative to compliance, problem 
solving requires that a broader and more diverse set of actors be involved, 
across a longer timeline, using a different set of information-gathering and 
decisionmaking mechanisms.171  Success is measured not by adherence to a 
rigid checklist, but by whether the firm’s institutional capacity to identify, 
prevent, and redress wrongdoing is improved, and sustainably so.  This is 
not to say that facially compliant or otherwise unsatisfactory 
accommodations will never be reached.  However, they stand a better 
chance of being identified, scrutinized by reference to important governance 
values, and addressed through the True Reform Undertaking process.   
Correlatively, the process should be flexible.  It should be capable 
of learning from its (carefully documented) successes and failures, and 
adjusting accordingly.  The Third Party should be willing to be creative 
about the means used to address firm pathologies, avoiding a priori 
preferences for particular approaches.  The Third Party should take an 
incrementalist approach, breaking the problem into manageable pieces and 
tackling each one based on its specific attributes.172   
The firm’s general governance standards, then, are realized and 
reinforced by the firm’s own careful, unique experience with the True 
Reform Undertaking process itself.173  This is no small point.  Through this 
                                                                                                                  
discipline imposed by participation.  Participation also realigns party interests, making 
possible agreements along unexpected lines.  See Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 
IOWA L. REV. 981, 1006 (1992). 
171See Sturm, The Promise of Participation, supra note 170.  The Reform Undertaking 
process should require ongoing periodic review after the Undertaking period itself is 
complete.  Only a few existing Reform Undertakings do so.  See, e.g., In re Banc of America, 
In re Putnam, supra note 142; In re Massachusetts Financial Services; see also In re Alliance 
Capital Management, supra note 32.  They do not require that either the Third Party or the 
Commission play any role in the review. 
172Sparrow argues that specificity, incrementalism, and flexible methods characterize many 
innovative civil and criminal enforcement techniques.  SPARROW, supra note 75, at 81-97.  
Similarly, Sturm argues that effective workplace problem solving regimes share four main 
characteristics:  they are (1) problem-oriented, (2) functionally integrated, and (3) data-
driven, and (4) accountable.  See Sturm, supra note 63, at 519-20. 
173Sturm, supra note 63, at 475 (“General rules, unless linked to local structures for their 
elaboration in context, provide inadequate direction to shape behavior”).  The nexus between 
broad compliance standards and specific governance and accountability mechanisms, 
combined with the presence of a centralized clearinghouse to evaluate individual firms’ 
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sort of participatory work, the True Reform Undertaking grows connections 
between the firm’s own operations and problem solving practices, and broad 
and vague governance and compliance standards, in a way that has nothing 
to do with facial adherence to externally-imposed, rigid rules.174  Overly-
defined rules are never more than a proxy for more general standards; but 
overly-vague standards are only made real through their situational learning 
and careful testing in practice.  Unlike traditional settlement arrangements, 
the True Reform Undertaking can make situational learning an integral part 
of Enforcement action. 
Profile of the Third Party 
Third Parties will have substantial discretion.  What do we know, 
then, about their ability to effect change?  How do we know they will not be 
captured, as agencies are sometimes captured by the entities they regulate?  
How will the Third Party manage resistance from inside the firm, and what 
resources will it rely on in the event of non-cooperation?  What rewards will 
the Third Party seek in return for taking on this potentially thankless task?  
The Reform Undertaking substantially transfers the ability to reward and 
forgive from Enforcement to a Third Party.  What, then, of the possibility 
that the firm’s and the Third Party’s mutual interests in closure and 
proclaimed success will also be aligned, and that gaming conduct, present in 
relations with Enforcement, will simply be transferred to the post-settlement 
timeframe?175  Given that the Enforcement context deals with worst actors, 
we cannot simply assume that firms will engage genuinely in the 
Undertaking process, without credible oversight and without the certainty 
that other possible shortcuts have been blocked. 
My purpose here is only to sketch out the broad outlines of the 
Third Party’s profile, to demonstrate the idea’s applicability to securities law 
                                                                                                                  
success, provide the missing components to Krawiec’s description of “network governance.”  
See Krawiec, supra note 118 (arguing that open standards-based regulations create 
incomplete contracts within which parties can engage in strategic gap-filling).   
174This also responds to Scholz’ worries about vague prophylactic compliance standards in 
the Enforcement context.  Scholz suggests that firms are tempted to cheat on vague 
directives, and prosecutors have the power to insist on Herculean efforts at reform after 
wrongdoing has occurred (even if a firm took reasonable and effective self-regulatory steps 
before the fact.)  This produces a prisoner’s dilemma, where both firms and the SEC would 
be better off with vague rules, but both sides could gain an even more favorable outcome by 
cheating on the other.  John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The 
Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory, 60-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 259 
(1997).  Making remedially-developed standards, instead of prophylactic ones, the driver 
dissipates some of this tension. 
175The worry brings to mind recent suggestions that so-called “independent” research 
analysts, whose industry was given an enormous boost by the terms of the 2003 Global 
Research Analyst Settlement, may also have conflicts of interest.  Ann Davis and Susanne 
Craig, Analyze This: Research is Fuzzier than Ever, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at C1. 
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enforcement.176  The problem is not a simple one, and the next step must be 
to identify the attributes that prove to be most important in actual securities 
law enforcement practice.  But to be effective, the Third Party will surely 
need four key attributes: credibility, independence, the right skill set, and 
accountability.   
The Third Party will need credibility with the SEC, but more 
importantly it will need credibility with the firm.  It should be able to speak 
the firm’s language, including the language of value-for-money that will be 
relevant to the firm’s perception of the Reform Undertaking process itself.  
The Third Party should be aware of, and be prepared to dispel, the 
perception that the True Reform Undertaking is a cynical process or a rent-
seeking opportunity for compliance professionals.177  The Third Party 
should probably be someone with previous experience in the industry writ 
large, and with sufficient gravitas to signal that the Undertaking has the 
attention of management and the SEC.178  This is one reason that it may 
make sense to appoint top-flight law firms or high profile individuals as 
Third Parties.  However, the most important element of credibility is likely 
the Third Party’s ability to continually generate trust.  Doing so requires 
transparency and good faith in dealing with the firm, in what will no doubt 
be trying circumstances.  Because we are dealing with worst-performing 
actors, it is appropriate to ensure that the Third Party has some considerable 
heft.  Nevertheless, the Third Party can only facilitate, challenge, and 
oversee a process that must have the firm’s own agency at its core.  Creating 
a communicative environment within which parties are willing to 
participate, and where they can imagine the possibility of a new way of 
doing business, is a crucial part of the role. 
Second, the Third Party will have to be independent from the firm.  
This comprises both structural and psychological elements.  Structural 
independence means that the Third Party should not be operating with a 
view to obtaining future business by currying the firm’s favor.179  The Third 
                                                 
176For a compatible and more comprehensive description of the roles of various problem 
solvers in addressing systemic problems, see Sturm, supra note 63, at 522-37. 
177See, e.g., Erica Beecher Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An 
Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 
368 (2003); Krawiec, supra note 118, 511-12, 528-32; Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997) (describing compliance personnel and lawyers as rent seekers). 
178See Sturm, supra note 152, at 35-40 (describing the role of mediating actors in gender 
equity regimes). 
179Most Reform Undertaking provisions restrict the Third Party’s ability to do business with 
the firm for a period of time after the Undertaking period is concluded.  See, e.g., GE 
InVision, supra note 141; Monsanto, supra note 141; the Investment Advisor Act 
Undertakings, supra note 142 (requiring the Third Party to agree that for the duration of its 
retainer and for two years thereafter, neither it nor, subject to the Commission’s consent, any 
firm with which it is affiliated shall “enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, 
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Party should also be able to rely on outside support, from the Commission, 
in the event of non-compliance.  The firm itself must recognize that it 
cannot exit.  It must know that facial compliance, “freezing out” the Third 
Party, or other dysfunctional behavior has a good chance of being spotted 
and will result in the direct reapplication of the SEC’s enforcement 
“stick”.180  At the psychological level, the Third Party must have the courage 
to publicly repudiate the process, or report to the Commission, if she 
concludes that it is failing irredeemably.181  Here, Judge Rakoff’s approach 
in the WorldCom settlement was to engage an individual whose own 
considerable reputational capital served as a buttress against the firm 
pressures.182 
                                                                                                                  
auditing or other professional relationship with InVision, its successor-in-interest . . . or any . 
. . present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their 
capacity”).  Existing Reform Undertakings also stipulate that the firm shall not have the 
ability to terminate the Third Party, and must cooperate with her investigation. 
180An outstanding question is whether the firm has a right to contest the Third Party’s 
findings.  One independent third party monitor with experience in anti-corruption initiatives 
in New York City believes that the risk is too great that an appeal mechanism relating either 
to the Third Party’s recommendations, or to any centralized best practices standards, would 
be hijacked by a firm that was disinclined to engage in the process in a meaningful way.  
Telephone interview with Carl Bornstein, attorney and independent third party consultant 
(Dec. 27, 2004).  Existing Reform Undertakings, supra notes 136 and 140-55, make no 
provision for appeal by the firm: although the firm can take issue with the Third Party’s 
recommendations, those recommendations must be followed if an alternative good faith 
agreement cannot be reached between firm and Third Party.  
181The Monsanto Reform Undertaking, supra note 141, requires the Third Party to 
affirmatively report violations of law to the company’s compliance officer, who “shall then 
be obligated to promptly report the same” to SEC staff.  Recently, Independent Monitor 
Edwin H. Stier publicly resigned his leadership of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters’ internal anticorruption program.  The program was established in 1999 as part of 
continuing federal oversight of the union following the 1989 settlement of a federal 
racketeering lawsuit.  Mr. Stier resigned on the basis that union President James P. Hoffa, Jr. 
had “backed away from the Teamsters’ anticorruption plan in the face of pressure from self-
interested individuals.”  Steven Greenhouse, Citing Pullback, Antigraft Team Quits 
Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A1.  There is considerable tension between the 
Third Party’s “snitching” function and its ability to win the firm’s trust.  See Note, Mastering 
Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L. J. 1062, 1063 (1979) (arguing that conflicts between the 
multiple roles of Special Masters appointed in the prison reform context hampers their 
effectiveness).  I do not believe this problem is insurmountable in this context.  These parties 
are likely to have had more experience than prison administrators and inmates normally 
would with contingent or nuanced professional relationships.  As sophisticated parties, they 
would likely respond positively to a clear statement of “ground rules” at the beginning of the 
engagement.  Also, relative to the prison situation, this situation is less focused on working 
through powerful intergroup and interpersonal tensions (although some will certainly exist) 
than by working through a process that will save the firm from shutdown.  Equally important 
is the background presence of the enforcement “stick” here, which operates on actors’ direct 
interests and forces them to the table in a particularly urgent way. 
182See Breeden, supra note 20. 
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Third, the Third Party will have to have a considerable range of 
skills, and a level of acceptability to all parties without being beholden to 
any.  (The Third Party can and perhaps should be a team, not one 
individual.)  The Third Party will have to have the ability to connect and 
facilitate dialogue across the firm hierarchy, and to manage large volumes of 
viva voce and paper or electronic information.  She and her team will need a 
strong knowledge base in compliance and corporate governance principles, 
including issues of organizational structure and experience with culture.  
The ideal Third Party may or may not be a lawyer.183  At the same time, she 
will have to be justice-regarding and able to take into account the power 
imbalances between, for example, management and the individuals that 
“followed orders” during the era of the law violations.  The Third Party 
must be alive to the possibility that the firm’s directing minds may be 
tempted to scapegoat individuals.  A “justice audit” should be part of the 
process.  The Third Party, like the firm, is a potential abuser of individual 
due process rights.184  Faced with the hurdles of trying to create change, the 
parties, Third Party included, could be tempted to satisfice for superficial 
compliance or less thorough reforms.  The Third Party may also be tempted 
by over-rigid resolutions in situations where any progress, however 
superficial, seems better than deadlock. 
For all these reasons, the Third Party must be accountable to the 
SEC.  Her ultimate report should speak not only to recommendations for 
firm change, but also to the Third Party’s own methodology and 
independence.  The Third Party cannot be the final arbiter of the success of 
her own recommendations.185  There must be a mechanism to ensure that the 
                                                 
183In other areas of reform-minded remedies, the most innovative New Governance has 
seemed to take place when lawyers are not at the table.  Linda Treviño has argued that the 
presence of lawyers signals mistrust, and signals that the reforms are the product of external 
compulsion; legal training also results in a focus on narrow, legalistic, compliance approach 
as opposed to a “values approach.”  Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal 
Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131 (1999). Contra Sturm, 
supra note 63, at 527-30 (applauding, through example, lawyers’ ability to develop “flexible, 
accountable” remedies aimed at reform). 
184This is a topic for another paper, but one must recognize the serious resource inequalities 
between the firm, the individual, and the Third Party that will exist in the Reform 
Undertaking process.  Richard Stewart has suggested that in the twenty-first century,  
new forms of administrative law will be developed to address the distinctive issues 
presented by the new network and economic incentive methods of regulation . . . . 
Formal legal procedures, backed by judicial review, will be targeted toward 
protecting private rights from particularized applications of regulatory power, 
although there may be renewed scope for tort law as well.  
Stewart, supra note 73, at 454.  See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2003) (arguing that current state action doctrine is inadequate to 
address the constitutional challenge presented by privatization). 
185See cf. Sturm, supra note 62, at 1413 (arguing, in the context of courts, that such a dual 
role creates an appearance of unfairness, and prevents a full articulation of the normative 
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same satisficing that characterizes the pre-settlement Enforcement process 
does not characterize the True Reform Undertaking process.  There should 
be no attorney-client privilege between firm and Third Party, since this 
promotes information hoarding and prevents comparative learning.186  The 
Third Party’s report should speak not only to areas where there was 
considerable success, but also to those inevitable areas where compromises 
were reached, or roadblocks were encountered.  The information should be 
capable of being aggregated—it should be set out in a sufficiently organized 
form that others can learn from it, and the Commission can compare one 
result to another.  At the same time, conscious attention should go to 
ensuring that there does not emerge a reporting “orthodoxy” that causes 
different firms to reach the same conclusions, not independently because 
they are good ideas, but rather through mimicry with a view to satisfying the 
Commission in the least intensive way.  Third Parties are not expected to 
reinvent the wheel—quite the contrary—but they should be prepared to 
demonstrate that they have given independent thought to the particular 
place, processes, and people before them. 
Obviously this is challenging work, but real success is far from 
impossible.  Enforcement action (buttressed as needed by additional 
enforcement “sticks”) is virtually the only way to put such a challenging yet 
promising investigative process in motion at a worst-acting firm. 
The Need for a Center 
Even if the Third Party succeeds in creating a Reform Undertaking 
process that can negotiate the pitfalls of collective self-reflection in this 
charged situation, progress will remain ad hoc and accidental without 
coordinating insights from other successful Reform Undertaking processes.  
On the aggregate level, as well, the SEC needs a mechanism that can 
compare one firm’s response to another’s, both to make the process credible 
and to augment Enforcement learning.  Information capture represents one 
of the real benefits of using Reform Undertakings over less transparent 
settlement mechanisms.  Conversely, a failure of good information 
processes significantly undermines the structure’s promise. 
Thus, the True Reform Undertaking approach should be reinforced 
by the active presence of a centralized data clearinghouse: i.e., an 
information-gathering and learning structure that aggregates information on 
                                                                                                                  
reasons underlying the adoption of a particular remedy).  In this respect, the fact that little 
public information has emerged on the SEC’s response to Third Parties’ final reports is 
worrying. 
186Appropriately, the more recent Reform Undertakings stipulate that there shall be no 
attorney-client relationship between firm and Third Party.  See, e.g., supra notes 142, 143. 
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the progress being made in these worst cases.187  Progress should be 
measured by reference to high-level impacts and outcomes, not just 
outputs.188  The clearinghouse function also serves a social signaling 
purpose.  Deterrence, on its own, sends a message of seriousness about 
corporate wrongdoing.  However, having a clearinghouse that can evaluate 
success in changing corporate culture sends a much deeper message of 
seriousness, and makes it clear that facial compliance or other mechanisms 
for short-circuiting the change process will not be tolerated. 
The clearinghouse must focus on best practices among Reform 
Undertakers, rather than “industry standards” or rigid rules.  This gives 
Enforcement the ability to define the ends to be achieved by comparison to 
other examples, and to challenge failing firms and their Third Parties to 
investigate the methods, and meet the achievements, of their peers.  In 
addition to providing Enforcement with standards by which to measure 
progress, valid centralized data gives both firms and their Third Parties more 
information, helping them to learn simultaneously from their own 
experience, and others’.  The clearinghouse would be in a position to 
mandate that firms and Third Parties maintain careful records, and record 
data in a way that permits aggregation with other data (from other firms and 
elsewhere), which helps predict potential problems and identify systemic 
weaknesses.  It should develop comparison matrices, and settling firms 
could be required to develop and make data available in that form as an 
additional settlement condition.  Measured performance improvement would 
have to be a presumptive condition for lifting True Reform Undertaking 
conditions.189 
                                                 
187Several New Governance scholars agree on the need for a centralized data management 
“clearinghouse.”  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 345-56 (calling for agencies to 
engage in benchmarking, or “comparative evaluations” of one another, in order to ultimately 
achieve best practices); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 189, 222-25 (2002) (advocating that 
different levels of government “pool” their information in order to “build a richer collective 
understanding . . .  of [a] problem”); Sturm, supra note 152, at 9.  See also SPARROW, supra 
note 75, at 167-68 (expressing a desire for agency’s to “organize the lessons they learn and to 
make the accumulated knowledge readily available”). 
188See WILSON, supra note 83, at 161-62.  This is not to say that identifying convincing 
outcome indicators for intangibles like the “culture of compliance” will be easy.  Tracking 
high-level impacts and outcomes is notoriously difficult, though not impossible.  See 
SPARROW, supra note 75, at 109-22, 281-92 (giving real-world examples of agencies’ 
frustrations in attempting to make such measurements, and suggesting a strategy to solve 
problems).  On the other hand, the difficulty of measuring such concepts does not change the 
fact that they are, in fact, the outcomes that need to be measured to determine a program’s 
success.  Nor is the problem unique to the Reform Undertaking situation. 
189Because of its situation within the enforcement context, there will never be as much room 
in my model for parties’ own articulation of novel governance standards as there is in the 
most wide-ranging versions of experimentalism.  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 
404-07.  Settling firms must be able to revise what constitutes “good governance,” and to 
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Crucially, a best practices regime (or “rolling best practices 
rulemaking”) forces better learning by firms.  Without conscious, outcome-
based analysis, institutional responses to the coercive Undertaking 
mechanism may produce imitative isomorphism between firms, based not 
on that firm’s internal investigation and considered response but rather on 
mimicry of other previously-approved compliance programs.190  Because the 
relationship between rule and response is reciprocal, industry practices in 
Reform Undertakings can become the basis of enforced legal norms for 
subsequent firms for no better reason than that others have used them.191  
The risk of “missing the mark” with any particular firm (and consequently, 
the risk of recidivism) increases to the extent that the received wisdom on 
how to navigate through the Reform Undertaking process, perhaps based on 
replicated industry standards and imperfect information about how a specific 
firm operates, misaligns the Undertaking response with root causes of 
wrongdoing.  Institutional learning by regulators is curtailed, and regulatory 
thinking is constrained.  By contrast, best practices standards are a 
continually evolving standard, which limits the parties’ ability to satisfice 
for facial compliance.192 
The SEC’s new Office of Risk Management, established in 2004, is 
the place for the clearinghouse function.  Its staff is tasked with gathering 
and maintaining data on new trends and risks from a variety of sources, such 
as external experts, domestic and foreign agencies, surveys, focus groups, 
and other market data, including both buy-side and sell-side research.  The 
Office of Risk Management also analyzes data to identify and assess new 
areas of concern across professions, companies, industries, and markets; and 
preparing assessments and forecasts on the agency’s risk environment.193  
                                                                                                                  
make a case for trying out novel compliance mechanisms, but their proposals would have to 
meet the approval of the SEC so long as they were operating within the Reform Undertaking 
timeline.  They would have to make their case quite compellingly, given their limited 
credibility in Enforcement eyes. 
190DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 55, at 66-67, 69-70. 
191See, e.g., Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990) (arguing that 
industry elaborations on broad equal protection requirements become the basis for court-
defined “industry standards,” constituting the statutory mandate for subsequent industry 
actors).  
192See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 354-56 (describing “rolling best practices 
rulemaking”); Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1074-75 (describing the “Veil Effect”).  
Obviously the presence of the words “best practices” in a firm’s compliance manual does not 
mean that best practices are observed.  See, e.g., supra note 20.  This observation only 
reinforces the need for a meaningful clearinghouse function. 
193See William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Regulatory Reforms To Protect Our 
Nation's Mutual Fund Investors Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (Nov. 18, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts111803whd.htm 
(canvassing the components of the new “risk management initiative”).  This discussion is 
also compatible with the SEC’s latest Strategic Plan, which focuses more explicitly on risk 
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The Office is an overarching body, not situated within Enforcement.194  It is 
structured around “internal risk teams in a ‘bottom-up’ approach for each 
major program area.”  The Office will coordinate those teams with a view to 
anticipation and early identification of potential problem areas, or illegal or 
questionable activities, across the securities industry.195  The work of the 
Office of Risk Assessment is complemented by a Risk Management 
Committee, whose primary responsibility is to review the implications of 
identified risks and recommend an appropriate course of action.196  The key 
challenge, as the risk management function defines itself, will be for it to 
actively develop rolling best practices rules as a basis for forcing 
accountability within the True Reform Undertaking process. 
Ramifying Back to the Enforcer 
As Jim Liebman observed in a different context, no one chose to 
create a prosecutorial system that seemingly rewards horse-trading and 
scapegoating, facial but meaningless compliance structures, and insensitivity 
to prosecutors’ inability to handle the massive volume of information they 
face.197  In identifying the prospect of spurring institutional reform of firm 
                                                                                                                  
assessment and data analysis, and the quality of internal agency functioning, than any plan to 
date.  According to the Plan, the information coming from the risk assessment process will 
also be used to make the SEC’s enforcement pyramid more informed and rational in its 
resource allocation: 
[s]uch risk assessment techniques also will help the SEC focus its examination and 
disclosure review programs. In identifying firms and filings to examine, the 
Commission is shifting away from a “one size fits all” review cycle to new risk-based 
approaches that direct resources toward those firms, issuers, filings, or industries that 
most warrant review. 
SEC 2004-09 Strategic Plan, supra note 87, at 25.   
194The clearinghouse should not be too closely tied to Enforcement.  The SEC must be in a 
position to pronounce the success or failure of each Reform Undertaking, but involving 
Enforcement in data-gathering reintroduces inefficiencies.  It also raises the risk that 
Enforcement will assume command-and-control style management of the processes, or will 
be unduly influenced by its own self interest in seeing the Reform Undertaking method work 
relative to other non-Enforcement initiatives. 
195See Press Release, SEC, Charles Fishkin Named Director of SEC's New Office of Risk 
Assessment (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-92.htm 
(describing the recenlty formed Office of Risk Assessment as responsible for managing and 
“coordinating risk assessment activities across the agency”).  
196See Donaldson, supra note 193. 
197See Liebman, supra note 130, at 2155-56.  See also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523 (2001) (arguing that criminal law-as-
written differs substantially from criminal law-as-enforced as a result of incentives for and 
politics between legislators, prosecutors, and judges, and warning that “the law’s messages 
are likely to be buried, swamped by local variation and hard-to-discern arrest patterns, by 
low-visibility guilty pleas and even lower-visibility decisions to decline prosecution”). 
MICHAEL LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 
(1987) (arguing that white collar criminal law and law enforcement in the United Kingdom is 
more the product of sporadic and irrational political forces than rational planning). 
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culture, and in recognizing its own institutional limitations in achieving that 
goal, SEC Enforcement may have succeeded above all in charting a path 
toward its own reform.  Recent scandals across financial sectors, followed 
by Enforcement scrambling to demonstrate its own continued relevance to 
problems of culture, has brought the clear incapacity of Enforcement’s 
processes into sharp relief and suggested new reformative possibilities.  
Seen this way, the SEC may only now be catching up with innovations in 
enforcement at other administrative agencies, where the utter failure of the 
command-and-control administrative model (not an issue in the disclosure-
based securities regulation context) began to force change more than a 
decade ago.198 
Enforcement behavior, like prosecutorial behavior more generally, 
is a product of its own structure and processes, and that structure will create 
its own context-specific effects.199  What an employer measures and rewards 
will have an effect on outcomes and employee behavior.  Thus, Enforcement 
staff should be trained to identify key elements of a forward-looking, 
transparent, and accountable remedial scheme, to be distinguished from 
resolutions that achieve case closure at the expense of other values, 
including due process to individuals or broader corporate citizenship norms.  
Individual Enforcement staff should be rewarded to the extent that their own 
decisions are demonstrably as information-based and systemically justified 
                                                 
198During the 1990s, enforcement functions in agencies such as Customs, the IRS, and OSHA 
began to develop their own vocabulary, focused on risk reduction, which incorporated the 
problem solving, results-oriented, data-intensive and industry-collaborative characteristics of 
New Governance regulation.  For a history of 1990s (non-SEC) administrative enforcement 
reform, see generally SPARROW, supra note 75.  Sparrow’s empirical research across 
regulatory bodies found that three common elements characterized the best new enforcement 
structures as of the year 2000:  (1) a clear focus on results—not in terms of process or quotas, 
but based on an expanded and more specific set of indicators including “big picture” Mission 
Statement-level impacts, behavioral outcomes such as compliance rates, agency activities, 
and outputs, and resource efficiency;  (2) adoption of a disciplined problem solving approach 
based on systematic identification and prioritization of important risks or patterns of 
noncompliance, a flexible and functional project-based approach, and periodic outcome 
evaluation with flexible resource allocation based on outcomes; (3) selective investment in 
collaborative partnerships.  Sparrow suggests (as I do here) that partnership with bad actors 
may be more important in achieving results.  Supra note 75, at 103-08. 
199See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758-87 (2003) (pointing out that structural and administrative factors 
influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).  The SEC’s latest Strategic Plan is striking 
for its use of risk-analytical and outcome-oriented methods, especially by comparison to prior 
Strategic Plan documents.   Compare SEC 2004-09 Strategic Plan, supra note 87, with SEC, 
1999 Annual Performance Report/2001 Annual Performance Plan (February 2000), at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra1999-2000.shtml.  The earlier SEC document, although it 
outlines six “preliminary” high level outcomes, describes 1999 Performance almost entirely 
in terms of outputs (number of enforcement actions brought, number of financial statements 
reviewed, number of SRO rules reviewed, etc.), and does not take an overarching risk 
analysis approach.     
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as the good governance requirements they impose on firms.200  The same 
standards of credibility and transparency that characterize the True Reform 
Undertaking process should characterize problem solving at Enforcement. 
Actually, reworking Enforcement staff incentives to reward 
transparency and demonstrably reasoned decision-making is the easy part.  
The larger challenge for Enforcement will be to imagine a global approach 
to securities law enforcement that remains healthily skeptical, liability-
conscious and closure-permitting, yet shows greater responsiveness to the 
strictures under which real-world enforcement operates, and the magnitude 
of the challenge of spurring widespread institutional reform.  New 
Governance theory offers a theoretical structure for making sense of the 
Reform Undertaking in both normative and efficiency-based terms.  In 
return, the creative action of enforcement personnel in practice is a reminder 
to New Governance theorists not to underestimate either the necessity or the 
creative potential of the enforcement role. 
Enforcement has its own purpose.  It is not a court, a corporate 
governance consultant, or a rulemaking administrative body.  This is not to 
say that, to the extent that Enforcement action can spur long term changes in 
firm behavior, we should fetishize the distinction between regulation and 
enforcement.201  The challenge in regulation is to identify how each actor 
can leverage its unique qualities of place and purpose to permit learning and 
wise, context-specific, impact-aware problem solving.  It requires the actor 
in question to understand the purposes it is trying to achieve, and to learn 
from its own experience. 
                                                 
200The SEC’s latest Strategic Plan emphasizes the need to “sustain and improve 
organizational excellence.”  The Plan announces a new continuing education program, new 
performance measurement systems, and a new Pay for Performance system for individual 
employees.  SEC 2004-09 Strategic Plan, supra note 87, at 26-27.  The SEC should include 
credit for innovative solutions that circumvent organizational limitations in performance 
metrics.  See also SPARROW, supra note 75, at 168 (recommending rewards for employees’ 
successful problem solving efforts). 
201Consider Mr. Cutler’s recent comments: 
As an enforcement lawyer, I am quite familiar with the complaint, often raised by 
defendants or respondents, and even by an occasional SEC Commissioner, that a 
proposed settlement amounts to rulemaking by enforcement.  While I’m confident 
that we hear that argument far more often than warranted, it points up that an 
enforcement proceeding can, in fact, realign an industry standard.  That is, when 
faced with the risks and costs of litigating an enforcement action, some parties may 
agree in settlement to change or restrict their future conduct in significant and far-
reaching ways. 
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks, After The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of The Mandatory 
Disclosure System (Feb. 21, 2003), in 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 545, 552 (2003). 
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5.  Toward a New Enforcement Model 
Forward-looking, reform-oriented regulatory structures can and do 
function within traditional Enforcement structures.  Understanding this 
hybridity requires some elaboration.  Three points seem especially 
relevant.202  First, one would not want to lose, through a novel enforcement 
approach, Enforcement’s unique structural advantages.  Certain elements of 
the enforcement model—primarily the reliance on temporary, task-specific 
teams and context-specific remedies—give enforcers an edge over other 
regulators in devising good responses to problems among public companies 
and regulated entities.  Second, one must be prepared to imagine that a 
flexible, learning-by-doing structure can exist embedded within a more 
traditional adversarial one.  Finally, the advantages of nesting New 
Governance experimentation within coercion can be significant, because it 
allows Enforcement staff to rely on the full range of behavior-modifying 
mechanisms, from shaming through information-forcing experimentalist 
remedies. 
Structural Advantages 
Perhaps surprisingly, certain aspects of the Enforcement function 
seem to mesh more naturally with New Governance mechanisms than do 
those mainstream regulatory functions that adapted the new methods first. 
To begin with, Enforcement mechanisms naturally work from the 
specific to the general, rather than the other way around.  Enforcement staff 
is tasked with responding to the empirical evidence from a particular case, 
and this spares them some of the clumsy overreaching of the under-informed 
rule-maker.  Indeed, as the history of New Governance initiatives has 
shown, command-and-control regulators have struggled to develop 
mechanisms to absorb and learn from the kind of information that flows 
continually and easily to Enforcement (a fact that causes one to wonder why 
enforcement divisions have not been central information-gathering tools for 
modern regulators across the board.) 
Second, compared to mainstream regulators, enforcement teams are 
flexible and temporary.  Law and practice have allowed them to operate 
relatively free of bureaucratic process obligations, and they are more likely 
to be immune to bureaucratic sclerosis: i.e., the accretive process and 
personnel commitments that make quick response capability difficult to 
                                                 
202My focus is on the Reform Undertaking as straddling device between New Governance 
and traditional enforcement models.  Many other important elements of building a new 
enforcement model are beyond this paper’s scope—how Enforcement ought to nominate and 
select firms for Reform Undertakings, and how Enforcement should allocate resources to 
individual projects.  See generally SPARROW, supra note 75, at 155-70 (describing 
components of a “problem solving infrastructure”).   
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maintain over time.203  Enforcement managers can choose the right people, 
internal and external, for the job at hand.  They can disband the teams when 
the job is complete, and they can have a new team coalesce for the next 
round without fear of flouting internal agency protocols.  To some degree, 
shifting team composition can prevent ingrained distrust from building up 
between parties, even where the temporary team members continue to come 
from a pool of Enforcement staff.  Because of their one-case-at-a-time 
orientation, the remedies that temporary teams develop (staffers and firms in 
drafting Reform Undertaking terms, and Third Parties and firms in 
effectuating them) can be tailored to the facts at hand.  Enforcement can 
experiment with multiple possible solutions at once, across short timelines, 
and try to force very discrete kinds of action in the hope of catalyzing a 
broader compliance cascade. 
Third, largely due to resource constraints, Enforcement practice is 
accustomed to decentralizing the investigatory and learning processes to the 
firm being investigated.  We have discussed the attendant risks above, but 
the practice also has the advantage of leaving some degree of agency with 
the industry actors themselves.  From this position, it is an extrapolation, 
rather than a complete change of direction, to work on achieving 
endogenous firm learning and norm generation. 
Finally, and importantly, enforcers have no choice but to be 
outcome-oriented, in that that they are tasked with finding solutions to 
specific problems.  Enforcement concentrates on taking action, and doing so 
with respect to the worst actors in the system.  Regulators may be tempted to 
focus on the most enlightened members of the regulated community, or to 
highlight “gold star” companies to demonstrate the wisdom of their policies.  
We should not forget that regulatory regimes operate within a larger 
political system, and that regulators can be responsive to political pressures.  
In contrast, frontline Enforcement staff have no choice but to try to do 
something about intransigent actors and intractable problems.  In this 
respect, so long as they are not allowed to take shortcuts in the form of 
credit-for-facial-compliance or credit-for-cooperation, Enforcement staff’s 
on-the-ground actions can have as much impact, though in a different way, 
as the broadest legislative responses.  For all of these reasons, as well as for 
the special constraints under which enforcers operate, the particular nature 
of enforcement action deserves closer study than it has received from New 
Governance scholars thus far. 
                                                 
203See Stewart, supra  note 74, at 440-42, 446-48 (describing events resulting in regulatory 
process “fatigue” in recent decades).  
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Embedding New Governance 
The conflict between firm welfare and investor protection is a 
mixed-motive situation.204  That is, over the long term, SEC Enforcement’s 
interests and the firm’s interests are neither purely cooperative nor purely 
competitive.  By pulling the reformative project away from the liability-
oriented one, the Reform Undertaking creates a space within which the 
parties can transcend adversarial win/lose dichotomies and concentrate on 
specific, achievable steps that can serve both long term investor protection 
and long term firm flourishing.  The Reform Undertaking, as introduced by 
SEC Enforcement, represents a significant new approach to securities law 
enforcement.  It contradicts the stereotype of enforcement personnel as stuck 
in an outmoded, adversarial, almost actively anti-reformative posture.205   
Bifurcating the problem solving remedy from the liability stage also 
allows Enforcement’s reform aspirations and its non-delegable mandate to 
coexist.  It embeds the reformative project within a still-viable prosecutorial 
function.  There are costs at the margins, in that the firm’s problem solving 
process will probably not be completely free of a coercive taint.  However, 
the comparison should be to other existing alternatives, not to an idealized 
problem solving technique.  At a minimum, the Reform Undertaking 
process holds out the possibility of catalyzing an endogenous reformative 
process within a firm—a possibility that is largely precluded by credit-for-
compliance and credit-for-cooperation settlement arrangements, and that 
may never be more than an accidental byproduct of massive deterrence.  
Perhaps one of the most exciting questions is how far back one can push the 
reformative project: i.e., whether the presence of an open and iterative 
remedy at the back end can give the SEC the comfort to rejig its modus 
operandi at the front end—moving away from both overly rigid-but-
enforceable rules in Enforcement, and underspecified-thus-costly 
prophylactic standards in regulation.206  One might hope for a new form of 
governance, emanating from Enforcement’s Reform Undertakings, that 
marries a high-level, standards-based understanding of compliance with the 
flexible and evolving yet specific architecture necessary to make those 
standards meaningful.  Further, one might hope for it under what is likely to 
                                                 
204See generally RICHARD WALTON & ROBERT MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR 
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (1965) (interpreting 
practices in labor-management negotiations in light of behavioral theory). 
205See supra note 79.  This is even more the case when speaking of criminal prosecutors’ 
similar innovations.  See supra notes 6, 11. 
206It is a harder project to ramify the learning all the way back to Congress, which also 
promulgates broad prophylactic requirements. 
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be the outcome-oriented and industry-focused, decentralized leadership of 
Chairman Cox.207 
The Reform Undertaking also serves as an optimistic 
counterexample to those who worry that adversarialism and entrenched 
interests inevitably consume or undermine fragile experimentalist 
processes.208  Relative to situations lower on the enforcement pyramid, 
enforcement is the least hospitable environment for New Governance 
solutions.  Mutual trust between the parties is substantially lacking.  Past 
efforts at voluntary compliance with law have demonstrably failed.   The 
primary actors in this scenario—Enforcement staff on one hand, and firm on 
the other—are operating in a high-stakes, adversarial, potentially punitive 
environment.  This is not a benign “laboratory for democracy,” and one 
party is in a position to impose sanctions on the other.209  Costs are clear, 
and high.  Nevertheless, Enforcement staff, on its own initiative and 
operating in its adversarial stance, has sketched out a structure that gives the 
worst actors in its regulated universe an opportunity to transcend that acute 
adversarial situation, through a reformist experiment. 
Remedial Agnosticism 
Experimentalism in its pure theoretical form might eschew the 
blaming/punitive component of enforcement in favor of prospective steps 
directed at future reform,210 but I argue for the continued utility of, and 
theoretical justification for, a full range of legal responses.  When dealing 
with the worst actors, the central concern must be what seems to work, most 
consistently and demonstrably, in effecting the sought-after change. 
                                                 
207 One set of observers has commented on the striking way in which the current presidential 
administration, through its emphasis on decentralization and accountability in government 
programs, may have put into motion an unexpectedly vast re-evaluation of public responses 
to systemic problems, far beyond those programs’ intended mandate.  They argue that, 
despite its many deficiencies, this may be the case with the No Child Left Behind Act in 
education.  See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act 
and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003). 
208See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 168-72 (2003) (urging caution 
against, but nonetheless advocating, “democratic experimentalism” because of its nascent 
status, its unknown outcomes, and its questionable effectiveness); Tushnet, New Institutional 
Structures of Governance and American Political Development, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 81 (manuscript at 18-20, on file with author) (observing that 
traditional national interest groups, such as teachers’ unions, may obstruct experimentalist 
programs). 
209See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country”). 
210See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L. J. 313 
(1997); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 336-39, 348-51.  
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I share the conviction that New Governance-style participatory 
problem solving processes are a most promising mechanism for spurring 
institutional reform.  This does not mean that one should hope for a deeply 
effective process to emerge spontaneously.  While New Governance puts 
actor agency at the core of its program, it is not a voluntary compliance 
model.  Most New Governance theorists would agree that in the regulatory 
context, a coercive “stick” is essential to making an enforcement pyramid 
function.211  Significantly, this is a stick of a different kind than that 
presented by the fear of massive one-time monetary sanctions.  It is 
information-forcing and participation-forcing over a longer period of time 
relative to a traditional enforcement action, and is directed at stimulating the 
kind of bottom-up change that is more likely to be sustained and self-
reinforcing.  When dealing with actors that require a “nudge” in the right 
direction, New Governance regulation (here, in the person of the Third 
Party) steps up inspections and sets comparative benchmarks to challenge 
the firm to face and respond to its own deficiencies in processes and 
outcomes.212  Firms can be expected to want less regulatory interference in 
their daily operations.  Thus, in situations where something like an 
experimentalist system is up and running, one can theoretically give firms 
incentives to improve by stipulating that good behavior (in the form of 
demonstrated good practices and internal learning) leads to greater 
autonomy, and bad behavior leads to greater scrutiny.213  One may anticipate 
a cascade effect as a critical mass of firms in a particular industry begin to 
observe good practices, to share information, and to put in place 
mechanisms that allow them to self-reflect.   
This paper’s concern is for what happens when the necessary 
mindset has not emerged and shows no signs of emerging among certain 
industry actors.  In other words, the question is what happens when, even if 
the need to do something seems clear and urgent to outsiders or to some of 
the parties involved, other key parties are resistant and even hostile to 
                                                 
211See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-41; John Braithwaite, Institutionalizing 
Distrust, Enculturating Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 343, 356 (Valerie A. Braithwaite 
et al., eds., 1998) (); Karkkainen, supra note 159; Karkkainen, supra note 63, at 485-89 
(rejecting a model of New Governance that obviates any need for “hardness” in the law); 
Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1067 n.154 (recognizing that the threat of sanctions is a 
“key function . . . [in] forc[ing] to the table a party who otherwise might not be willing to 
negotiate at all”); Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes 
Disclosure Policies Sustainable?  Institute for Government Innovation 41-42 (OPS 02-03), at 
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/research/papers/FGW.pdf (asserting that enforcement is 
a central component of New Governance). 
212See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 336-39 (recognizing that “firms often turn to third 
parties to organize benchmarking”). 
213It makes sense to speak specifically of experimentalism in this section.  Among New 
Governance approaches, experimentalism provides the most completely imagined description 
of incentive systems for ratcheting up best-practices learning among decentralized groups. 
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reform efforts.214  Some firms and even some industries may be too 
pathological or dysfunctional, and their own stories about themselves too 
entrenched, to be pulled in through experimentalist incentives.  A system 
that presumes a certain base level of capacity and bona fides among industry 
actors will find no initial purchase among the worst actors.  New 
Governance theory would respond by shutting the intransigent firm down.  
The top end of the New Governance enforcement pyramid is the “penalty 
default.”   It is a harsh result, suboptimal for all parties (including 
shareholders and employees), which operates as a default outcome in the 
event that Enforcement and firm fail to reach a satisfactory 
accommodation.215  In practical terms, this means that SEC Enforcement 
retains the right and the means to destroy or shut down the noncompliant 
firm.216  To function as intended, however, the default option must be 
credible.  Enforcers must be willing, in extreme cases, to allow the default 
option to play itself out.217   
                                                 
214It is thought that new forms of experimentalist governance are most likely to emerge in 
circumstances where both ends and means are disputed, and yet there is a collective sense of 
urgency about the need to do something.  Without knowing how frequently those conditions 
prevail, or how close to ideal conditions one must get before experimentalism starts to gain 
momentum, we can agree that those conditions are not obviously present in every situation 
that calls for institutional reform. 
215See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (coining the term “penalty default” in the 
context of contract theory); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and 
Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 965-83 
(2003) (introducing the “regulatory penalty default” in the environmental context).  Penalty 
defaults are likely to prove especially useful in contexts where, due to a high degree of local 
variability, the best results are highly fact and context specific.  Id. at 977.  This applies to 
institutional corporate governance reform as well.  Karkkainen worries about rent-seeking 
agencies and whether the need for an objective third party to impose the penalty default are 
also apropos.  Id. at 938-90. 
216E.g., through punitive fines forcing the firm into bankruptcy.  In bringing even a successful 
civil fraud conviction against a firm in federal court, the SEC triggers other federal statutes 
that may make it difficult for the corporation to continue as a going concern.  See, e.g., the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 9.406 – 407 (2005) barring or suspending a firm 
from obtaining federal government procurement contracts.  Reputational effects, private 
securities litigation, and (less commonly) state business charter revocation may also follow 
on the heels of an SEC investigation and force a company into bankruptcy.  The SEC also 
cooperates with criminal prosecutors on the most serious cases. 
217I am not suggesting that giving regulators the power to shut down noncompliant actors is 
unique to New Governance theory; far from it.  I mean that the penalty default is an integral 
component of the enforcement pyramid structure that informs the New Governance approach 
to enforcement.  In fact, even the idea of an enforcement pyramid has deep roots in securities 
regulation.  As William Orville Douglas stated decades ago, government’s role in regulating 
finance was to “keep the shotgun . . . behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for 
use but with the hope that it would never be used.”  W.O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND 
FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940). 
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The penalty default is a necessary part of any enforcement scheme, 
but it should operate as a last resort.  Except when dealing with utterly 
criminal organizations, public interest considerations argue against 
destroying publicly held, wealth-creating, and job-providing organizations, 
even where they may be quite flawed in governance terms.  Nevertheless, 
there may be considerable space between the penalty default option and the 
point at which experimentalist learning necessarily will take hold.  For this 
reason, other options, including the use of traditional enforcement sanctions, 
should be considered before enforcement’s worst-case-scenario is allowed 
to play itself out.218 
In fact, prosecution in all its forms can focus the mind.  A True 
Reform Undertaking, embedded within and buttressed by deterrent 
sanctions, shaming, selective business line shutdown,219 individual liability, 
disgorgement or restitution, and any number of other enforcement options 
can be the bridge between the worst actor and the abyss.  Shaming and 
blaming can serve a forward-looking purpose as well as a retrospective 
one.220  Public liability determinations, too, affect a firm’s reputational 
                                                 
218Some experimentalist work does envision spurring reform through graduated traditional 
sanctions.  E.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 68.  Thus far, this avenue is underdeveloped.  This 
project moves beyond the drug treatment court model in note 68 in the following ways: it is 
concerned with the actions of enforcement personnel, not a specialized but still arm’s length 
court.  As such it must address the complicated strategic environment of settlement, rather 
than picking up the narrative after the subject individual has already pled guilty.  As well, 
problems of responsibility, causation, and remedy are substantially more complex for the 
regulator when addressing institutional culture rather than individual drug-related law 
violations.  While the drug treatment court model focuses on the court as experimentalist 
organ, this project is preoccupied with spurring a decentralized experimentalist process 
within settling firms, producing a subsequent feedback effect on SEC Enforcement.  The 
absence of a court structure at the center of this project makes it more challenging, 
contingent, and complex, but also more reflective of actual securities law enforcement 
practice. 
219This is one of the options being considered by the New York Stock Exchange.  See supra, 
note 28. 
220Two scholars making this point, essentially on expressive grounds, are Schlegel and 
Braithwaite.  See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION  (1989) (arguing 
that public condemnation and shaming can have a reintegrative and community-affirming 
effect on law violators and those affected by them); SCHLEGEL, supra note 13 (arguing that 
punishing corporations sends an important message of social condemnation distinct from any 
subsequent general deterrent effects).  New Governance scholars have pointed out important 
differences between the profile of a retrospective, liability-allocating model and the 
imperatives inherent in a remedial, or otherwise more prospective and problem solving, 
model.  There may be a tendency to overdraw the distinction in the interest of making it 
visible.  See, e.g., Simon, supra note 81 (contrasting “mainstream jurisprudence” with 
“Toyota Production System as jurisprudential phenomenon”).  In any remedial process 
arising out of a finding that the organization’s previous practices are unacceptable, 
allocations of liability will leave an impression on subsequent events.  Forward-looking 
remedial problem solving mechanisms are, of course, different from retrospective liability 
determinations, but those involved in the problem solving will not (and should not be 
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capital.  Network effects in business relations flow from and often reinforce 
the shaming effect of public sanction.221  If firms believe that the adverse 
consequences for failing at the Reform Undertaking stage will be swift, 
significant, and certain, then even unreconstructed “old school” 
Enforcement action may get people moving.222  Some of these options may 
be necessary, if insufficient, components of a comprehensive coercive 
reform-spurring process.   
In this way the line between deterrence and reform generation blurs, 
reminding us of the danger of overdrawing that distinction.  None of this 
undermines the promise of the New Governance approach: it does not say 
that sanctions work and New Governance is epiphenomenal.  What it does 
say is that New Governance-inflected approaches to reforming firm culture 
can work, especially when reinforced by consequences for failure.223  While 
alternate sanctioning effects will impose some costs on the problem solving 
process, the only way to determine whether the costs are worth running is to 
set up a mechanism by which the SEC can monitor and evaluate the Reform 
Undertaking structure in practice.  This brings us full circle.  In focusing on 
reforming firm culture, and in taking the first steps toward incorporating 
New Governance style remedies into its approach, SEC Enforcement may 
have charted a path toward its own institutional reform. 
Postscript: A Different Kind of Governance 
This paper identifies some dangers of over-abstraction in discussing 
governance.  Securities law enforcement is a system that attempts to protect 
investors and allocate responsibility for past wrongdoing, veined through 
with other values such as efficiency, retributivism, the search for political 
capital, and the market pressure toward closure.  Moreover, who enforces 
the principles—be it courts, the actors themselves, or some third party—is at 
                                                                                                                  
expected to) operate as though history and liability were irrelevant.  On the contrary, one of 
the key functions of the problem solving process will be to make sense of the organization’s 
collective history. 
221See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
222Commissioner Glassman has said:  
[T]here is no question that fear is a potent motivator. Therefore, if fear of an  
investigation or enforcement action motivates board directors and executives to 
make sure that their companies are complying with the spirit and the letter of the 
securities laws, that's OK with me – just as long as the result is that people are 
encouraged to, and in fact, do the right thing. 
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech at the Practicing Law Institute:  My Top 10 
Observations as an SEC Commissioner (Mar. 5, 2004), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030504cag.htm. 
223See also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (arguing that even while police compel 
obedience through the threat or use of force, they can also gain the cooperation of people 
with whom they deal if they behave in procedurally fair ways). 
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least as integral to how and whether it will work as is the theoretical 
distinction between New Governance and other methods.  It is only likely to 
work where all parties believe that they will be accountable, through 
transparent processes, to a larger audience than they can control. 
The securities law enforcement example is a lesson in the value of 
contextual analysis and open-minded examination, not only as a theoretical 
matter relevant to regulators but also as an imperative for those of us that 
write about them.  Innovations are taking place, perhaps unexpectedly for 
New Governance scholars, in the interstices of securities law enforcement 
practice.  They risk going unnoticed by those most pessimistic about the 
enforcement model’s limitations, or most committed to the bright line 
between retrospective, liability-oriented mechanisms and prospective, 
remedial-stage problem solving ones. 
This paper does not propose final solutions, and it leaves some 
questions unanswered.  Yet, it argues that a coherent hybridity between 
experimentalism and securities law enforcement structures can, and should, 
exist.  In presenting the differences between existing settlement approaches 
and the new Reform Undertaking model, the right questions, from the 
perspectives of justice, accountability, market health, and investor 
protection, have been raised. 
Even more significantly, in trying on the Reform Undertaking 
approach, SEC Enforcement has opened the door to further developing its 
own, unique expression of New Governance style learning in the particular 
enforcement universe within which it operates.  In its best form, the 
powerful combination of enforcement and New Governance contains the 
potential to transform not only the way the SEC deals with the worst actors, 
but also the way it structures itself.  These are exciting developments that 
will bear watching. 
 
